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1eXeCUtIVe sUMMARY
The aim of this study is threefold: It investigates the ways in which vari-
ous forms of media, including new media, shape youth identity in South 
Africa. Secondly, it probes the possible ways in which media contribute 
to the civic identity of South African youth. Thirdly the study explores 
whether the media reflect youth voices. Information from this study will 
show if and how the media contribute to the construction of the so-
cial identities of the South African youth and if these identities help the 
youth to contribute to the strengthening of South Africa’s democracy. 
This information will also contribute towards formulating media policy 
that is responsive to the needs and interests of the South African youth.
MetHoDoLoGY
This analysis is based on three sets of data:
Quantitative survey data comes from survey questionnaires completed 
by 956 respondents, mostly between 15 and 30 years of age in four 
provinces: Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. 
These sites were selected for a combination of reasons. The provinces 
are the four most populated provinces in South Africa (Census 2011). 
Two of the provinces are uniquely representative of particular historical 
classifications of the South African population: Coloured people form 
the majority of the population in the Western Cape (Hendricks, 2005: 
118) and the majority of Indian South Africans live in KwaZulu-Natal. 
According to the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA) (2000) the 
province was divided along racial lines in the following way – 84.9%, 
Black African, 1.5% Coloured, 8.5% Indian, 2.4% White.1 A practical 
consideration for choosing the locations was the fact that the institu-
tional partners were based here: Gauteng – Media Tenor, Eastern Cape 
– Rhodes University, Western Cape – University of Cape Town, and Kwa-
Zulu-Natal – Durban University of Technology. Just over 87% (87.2%) of 
respondents were between 15 and 30 years old, with only 12.8% above 
31 years. The information therefore shows a bias towards younger re-
1 http://www.sahealthinfo.org/bod/kwazulunatal.pdf
2spondents. There was a fair gender balance across respondents with 
50.8% female respondents and 49.2% male respondents. Because race 
remains a significant socio-economic indicator in post-Apartheid South 
Africa, respondents were asked to identify themselves as Black African 
(57%), Coloured (13%), Indian (11%) and White (6%). Due to the rela-
tively small numbers of Indian and Coloured respondents and because 
there were no significant differences in responses across questions for 
these two categories and they have been grouped together in the re-
sults. There is a more extensive discussion on the race categories in the 
main section of the report.
Media Tenor2 conducted a quantitative content analysis of the kind 
of media coverage of the youth in both print and broadcast (television 
only) media in South Africa. A total of 8736 articles were analysed from 
South African print media between January 2011 and July 2012. Ar-
ticles were chosen on the basis of whether they have the youth as sub-
jects. Each article was analysed for the following variables: 
• Who/what is the subject
• what is the field of business of the subject
• where does the action take place
• what time does the statement refer to
• what topic is the statement about
• who is the source of the statement
• and the tone or value of the statement (whether it is negative, posi-
tive or neutral).  
Print media analysed were: Beeld, Business Day, Business Report, Busi-
ness Times, Cape Times, City Press, Daily Dispatch, Daily Sun, Die Burg-
er, FinWeek, Financial Mail, Isolezwe, Mail & Guardian, New Age, Rap-
port, Sake24, Sowetan, Star, Sowetan, Star, Sunday Independent, Sunday 
Times, Times, Witness. Broadcast media analysed were the following 
news broadcasts, all on television: SABC3 News@One, E-TV News, Afri-
kaans News, SABC2, English News, SABC3, Zulu/Xhosa News, SABC1, 
Sotho News, SABC2, KykNet (Afrikaans), SiSwati/Ndebele News, SABC1, 
2 Media Tenor is an international media analysis institute “in the field of applied Agen-
da Setting Research, serving partners in the corporate, government and scientific world 
with strategic media intelligence” (http://www.mediatenor.co.za/ou_who_we_are.php).
3SABC3 news@10 and SABC3 Africa News Update. 
Focus group discussions provide qualitative information and offer 
insight into a number of issues that emerged in the quantitative data. 
Focus group discussions were conducted in three provinces in South Af-
rica: Gauteng, Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal. In total 14 focus group 
discussions were conducted with a total of 107 participants across the 
demographic range: unemployed / employed (full time and part time), 
students (full time and part time), young people living in rural and urban 
areas, and participants across all racial categories. In addition to a better 
understanding of the survey data, the focus group discussions offer a 
deeper understanding of young people’s perceptions of community, civ-
ic and political engagement, media use, and attitudes towards the media 
in relation to political and civic engagement. The choice of focus group 
participants was shaped by the results of the survey and participants 
were identified based on variables that showed particular relevance in 
the results emerging in the survey data. These variables include age, 
rural/urban location, gender, race, and employment status. 
A qualitative policy analysis was conducted to provide an overview of 
youth policies in South Africa. The analysis focuses on whether general 
youth policy and specifically media policy promote active youth partici-
pation in the public sphere. Researchers analysed the National Youth 
Policy 2009-2014, the Children’s Act, the Films and Publications Act, 
and the Media Development and Diversity Agency Act. The aim of the 
policy analysis is to allow the research to make policy recommenda-
tions based on key focus areas identified by the government. This policy 
analysis is related to the key findings of the study and allows for recom-
mendations for better youth engagement and participation in the public 
sphere through the media.
4FInDInGs
The findings are collated in relation to information from the surveys, the 
focus group discussions, the content analysis and in comparison with 
the research conducted by the Dutch partners. 
Media coverage on the youth
The content analysis identifies trends of reporting on the youth as well 
as issues most closely associated with youth. The analysis focuses on 
reportage of organisations and programmes concerned with youth de-
velopment. The analysis also examines political coverage on youth. 
In general the content analysis shows an unbalanced trend of report-
ing on gender with young males receiving almost 20% more coverage 
than young women. Analysis of long-term media trends indicates that 
the share of coverage on women is decreasing over time. Another im-
balance in coverage emerges with regard to coverage of White youth 
and Coloured youth. While coverage of Black African and Indian youth 
is relatively proportionate to population estimates, the content analy-
sis shows more coverage of White youth compared to coverage of Co-
loured youth. According to Statistics South Africa’s population estimates 
for 2011 there are 8.64% Coloureds and 9.09% Whites currently living 
in South Africa, Yet White young people receive more than twice the 
amount of coverage when compared with coverage of Coloured youth.
Education was by far the top issue in terms of volume associated with 
the youth covered in the media. A total of almost 1 500 news items 
focused on education in the review period with the next biggest issue – 
crime – getting mentioned in just over 200 items. Of the 1 500 items, 
almost 1 200 were either negative or neutral news items with the re-
mainder being positive. See Figure 2 for a breakdown of the volume and 
ratings of top issues in the media associated with South African youth.
In terms of crime, the top three issues in terms of volume related to cov-
erage of rape/sexual abuse (more than 40), murder (less than 35) and 
kidnapping (less than 30). The third issue in terms of volume was health 
with about 200 articles. Of these, the biggest volume of news items was 
5about HIV and AIDS (just more than 40), followed by pregnancy (just 
more than 20). Substance abuse, food poisoning and neonatal deaths 
were the next biggest health issues in terms of volume, all of them being 
covered in between 15 and 20 news items.
The lowest number of news items covering the youth related to social 
services, politics and the justice system (each with about 50 news items 
for the time period in review).
Media use
Most respondents say they use radio news most for getting informa-
tion (70.8%), with SA TV3 news (67.3%) as the second highest source of 
information. Google or other search engines was the third most-stated 
source of news media (62.8%). The medium used the least by survey 
respondents to gather news is tabloid newspapers (38.5%). Figure 10 
gives a breakdown of findings in terms of media usage.
Unemployed youth favour SA television (SA TV) and radio most as 
news sources (both at 82.5%). SA TV is also the most favourite source 
of employed youth (71.9%). Radio news is the most significant source 
of news for youth attending school (73.4%) with Google or other search 
engines the second most preferred source (68.9%). The most preferred 
way for young people in college of university to access the news is 
through Google or other search engines (68.4%). Six out of 10 young 
people (61.3%) in this category said they use social media as a news 
source – the highest amongst all the occupation categories4. 
Media usage amongst South African youth is surprisingly comparable 
with the young people in the Netherlands who also still favour tradition-
al broadcasting media rather than printed newspapers. South African 
youth favour radio more than television as opposed to Dutch youth who 
favour television over radio as their most important news source.
3 The survey distinguished between South African television and international televi-
sion. SA TV includes South African channels such as SABC, e-TV, KykNet and Soweto-TV.
4 Google or other search engines as a news source: In school, 52.9%; employed, 50.5%, 
and unemployed, 39.5%.
6Perhaps more revealing in terms of what young people use media for, 
are the results regarding their interest in specific topics. Survey respon-
dents were asked to rate a number of specific media topics according to 
those they are most interested in. The results reveal not only their inter-
est in popular culture (which was the highest at 86.3%), but also their 
significant lack of interest in politics or topics that relate to politics. Of 
the two lowest topics of interest, both related to politics, with political 
actions the least interesting (34.6%), and politics/government the sec-
ond lowest (37.9%). 
Media and institutional trust
Respondents were asked about their trust in local, provincial and national 
government. The results show significantly low levels of trust in all three 
levels of government with trust in local government showing the low-
est level. Only 34.4% respondents say they trust local government a great 
deal or quite a lot. Close to four out of ten (38.3%) respondents say they 
trust provincial government quite a lot or a great deal and 40.9% of re-
spondents say they trust national government a great deal or quite a lot. 
There is no significant change in levels of trust across the different age 
categories of survey respondents. Figure 16 illustrates differences across 
other variables like race, rural / urban, income and employment.
Race is a significant variable in levels of trust in public institutions. In-
dian/Coloured youth show very low levels of trust across all institutions. 
White youth are also less trustful of public institutions than Black Af-
rican youth. White youth are most trustful of private companies. Black 
African (77%) and Indian/Coloureds respondents have high levels of 
trust in religious institutions (73.3%) and White youth have low levels 
(53.4%) of trust in religious institutions. 
Young people in South Africa are generally uninterested and mistrust-
ful of political institutions and political parties. This includes low lev-
els of trust in the legal system, the police, and in parliament. Only 30.7% 
of respondents say they trust political parties either a great deal or quite 
a lot. This mistrust in political institutions and political parties could 
have implications for strategies to strengthen democracy or building 
civic identities in South Africa. 
7Young people who live in rural areas are more trusting of public institu-
tions than those who live in large cities. Interestingly, those who live in 
rural areas show less trust in the older generation (75.1%) than those 
who live in large cities (77.8%), while those who live in small towns 
show the highest levels of trust in the older generation (80.5%). This 
trend is reversed when one examines trust in religious institutions with 
respondents in rural areas showing higher levels of trust (75.3%) than 
those in large cities (69.8%), and respondents in small towns (78.3%) 
showing the highest levels of trust in religious institutions. 
Compared to levels of trust in political institutions, levels of trust in the 
media are significantly high amongst South African youth: TV news 
(79.5%), radio news (78.3%) and newspapers (71.9%). Almost six out of 
ten respondents say they trust magazines and social media (59.2% and 
57.7% respectively).  
Most young South Africans note the older generation as an insti-
tution they trust most (77.4%). Although there are some differences 
amongst race groups (Indians/Coloureds, 84%; Black Africans, 76.5%; 
Whites, 75.4%) these are relatively high in comparison with trust shown 
in other institutions. Figure 18 provides a breakdown of levels of trust 
in different institutional categories.
Civic identity and the media 
One of the aims of the research project is to determine whether young 
South Africans use the media to establish their civic identity and wheth-
er the media form part of the resources they draw on to establish their 
identity as South African citizens. 
In order to evaluate this quantitatively, respondents were asked which 
entertainment and lifestyle media they felt provided the most relevant 
information to them as young South Africans. Interestingly the top 
three media most relevant to respondents are radio (37.7%), social 
media (34.1%), and Google or other search engines (33.8%). This is 
significantly different (except for radio) to usage figures for the media 
that show TV, radio, and SMS as the three top media regularly used 
by young people. This may indicate that while young South Africans 
8regularly use certain media, they find the information they receive on 
those platforms as less than relevant to their lives.
When asked which media they felt provided the most relevant news 
and information the results were quite different (again except for ra-
dio) with the top three being radio (44%), SA TV news (42.9%), and 
mainstream newspapers (39.1%). Trends across age groups show that 
the older respondents become, the more relevant these three media 
are to them. Mainstream newspapers’ relevance to 15-20 year olds is 
30.9%, but for 21-30 year olds it is 44.9% and for 31+ year olds it is 
49.2%. The findings further show that young White South Africans find 
the news and information from the media more relevant than other race 
groups. (Except for tabloids that show low levels of relevance across all 
race categories.) Figure 22 gives a breakdown of the relevance of news 
media across race groups.
Focus groups discussion probed the relevance of news media in more 
depth. When focus group participants were asked if they felt the news 
media was relevant and of interest to young people the results varied. 
The generally negative perceptions about the news media raised by 
focus group participants correspond with the survey results. Focus 
group participants raised two issues in particular: the first was that neg-
ativity in the news media is unappealing to them and secondly, that 
they find the news media irrelevant because it does not help them to 
make sense of specific contexts. Figure 24 shows a breakdown of sur-
vey responses to the question what could make the media more relevant 
to young people.
Civic engagement and the media
In part, this research aims to examine the levels of engagement by the 
youth in different kinds of civic, social or political activity. Survey re-
sponses and focus group discussions reflect low levels of political activ-
ity and engagement. Willingness to vote, political activity and general 
interest in politics was particularly low amongst South African youth 
across the categories, and this is perhaps one of the most striking re-
sults of the data. Survey respondents were asked which activities they 
had been involved in during the last 12 months. Of the options, politi-
9cal activities were often at the lowest level of responses. The data show 
young South Africans tend to participate more in civic or social activi-
ties. Helping a neighbour was the most common answer from survey 
respondents (79.1%), with being involved in a social group (67.4%) and 
being active in a religious activity (64.9). Respondents reported rela-
tively low participation even in activities specifically aimed at youth 
involvement, such as activity in a youth movement, and being part of 
the student council. Figure 25 gives a breakdown of participation levels 
in 16 different activities.
While levels of involvement in political activities are low across all catego-
ries of respondents, young Black Africans show higher levels of involve-
ment in political activities than other races. Black African respondents 
are significantly more involved in youth movements (40.8%) than both 
White (36.5%) and Indian/Coloured (36.3%) respondents. With regards to 
trade union activity Black African respondents are almost twice as likely 
to be involved (13.8%) than White (7.5%) and Indian/Coloured (7.6%) re-
spondents. Black African respondents are almost three times more likely 
to be involved in party political activities (23.3%), than White respondents 
(8.2%), and almost five times more likely than Indian/Coloured respon-
dents (5.8%). One category where Indian/Coloured respondents are sig-
nificantly more involved is in religious activities. Indian/Coloured youth 
show the highest levels of involvement (71.3%) over Black African youth 
(67.1%), and White youth (46.3%). White youth show the highest levels 
of involvement in activities that take place online (posting views to an 
online blog/group, and visiting online forums).
In focus groups, engagement in political and civic activities (such as 
charitable work and signing a petition) was further examined. These dis-
cussions provide greater insight into some of the reasons for the lack of 
participation and engagement. Focus group participants were asked at 
different points during the discussions about the problems they face as 
youth and whether they feel they can do anything about these problems. 
The responses reveal perceptions of a lack of agency with regards to 
being active in their communities or helping other people. Some of 
the responses indicate that the youth themselves feel they need to give 
assistance but they are not in a position to help others.
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Conclusions and recommendations
Do the media reflect youth voices?
While young people use traditional and some new media for gathering 
news and information, there is a strong sense from the results that the 
youth do not feel that the media are relevant to them. This may indicate 
that while young South Africans regularly use certain media, they find 
the information they receive on those platforms as less than relevant 
to their lives. It could be in the interest of the media and especially the 
news media, to investigate issues of media relevancy and what it means 
for young people in more detail. This investigation could include tar-
geting more content specifically towards young South Africans. This is 
particularly true of Black African and Indian/Coloured youth who feel 
strongly about the need for youth content in newspapers.
Do the media contribute to the construction of social identities?
The results of this study illustrate that young people across South Africa 
need support in developing a civic identity. The older generation has 
emerged as a key support system for young people in this study. This 
can be used to great advantage by educators, NGOs, the National Youth 
Development Agency, government departments, private companies and 
other facilitators in thinking creatively about ways to engage young 
people (across all key categories) in civic and political life. 
It is evident that young people use a range of media to build their civic 
identities, that they use the media to access news, and that there are high 
levels of trust in the media in general. The Media Development and Diver-
sity Agency, which engages with community media across the country, 
should be required to engage more with young people about conceptions 
of relevance, trust and content targeting youth in general. The MDDA 
could also encourage recipients of its funding to target young people. 
The youth and the strengthening of South Africa’s democracy
Willingness to vote, political activity and general interest in politics was 
particularly low amongst South African youth across the categories. The 
data further show that young people are mistrustful of politics and po-
litical processes. The findings also generally show that youth are unin-
terested in politics as a topic for media consumption. 
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Two issues emerge in relation to these findings that need further inves-
tigation: The first, is the disparity between respondents reporting low 
levels of interest in voting, but reporting relatively high levels of having 
actually voted in the last national and local government elections. The 
second issue to explore is a possible relationship between actual voting, 
willingness to vote and the low levels of trust in public and political in-
stitutions reported in the survey and in focus groups.
Media policy responding to youth needs
Young people with access to the internet (whether through their mobile 
phones or laptop/PC) are using this resource to find information that 
is relevant to them. This is an avenue for further engagement with the 
youth if levels of access, literacy, affordability and usage are increased. 
This is particularly true for Black African youth, unemployed youth and 
youth with little or no schooling. Access to internet resources will allow 
young people to control the content they receive, find information and 
news that is relevant to their context and perhaps even generate content 
of their own that can be shared by other youth. The use of search en-
gines, and other online media do play a role in news awareness amongst 
some South African youth. It is also evident that because of the per-
ceived lack of relevance in traditional media, those who can are using 
online sources to gather information and news that is relevant to them. 
The National Youth Policy document addresses some of the issues relat-
ed to technology where it proposes access to ICTs as one of the ways in 
which opportunities for young people can be enhanced (2009:31). The 
policy document mentions ICT peer education as among the youth’s re-
sponsibilities and proposes that young people should “engage in peer to 
peer education to promote youth development in areas such as literacy, 
use of information and communication technology, healthy lifestyles to 
prevent no communicable [sic] diseases like HIV and AIDS and others, 
violence prevention and peace building” (2009: 20). This is an impor-
tant step towards responding to the needs of the South African youth as 
expressed in the survey and focus group discussions.
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IntRoDUCtIon
The aim of this study is threefold: It investigates the ways in which vari-
ous forms of media, including new media, shape youth identity in South 
Africa. Secondly, it probes the possible ways in which media contribute 
to the civic identity of South African youth. This civic function of the me-
dia, as captured partly in Habermas’s notion of the public sphere5, is im-
portant if youth are to become integrated into the fabric of society and 
participate in its development. Thirdly the study explores whether the 
media reflect youth voices. Failure on the part of the media to articulate 
youth aspirations and frustrations may contribute to feelings of alien-
ation. This alienation is already evident in youth disengagement from 
and disaffection with societal institutions. Information from this study 
will show if and how the media contribute to the construction of the so-
cial identities of the South African youth and if these identities help the 
youth to contribute to the strengthening of South Africa’s democracy. 
This information will also contribute towards formulating media policy 
that is responsive to the needs and interests of the South African youth. 
In South Africa, youth6 constitute 70% of the population. Those 15 years 
and younger constitute 35% of the population (Statistics South Africa 
2009). Although most aspects of South Africa’s youth remain under-re-
searched, Gower (2009) notes that nearly three million of the 6.7 million 
young South Africans are disengaged from society’s major institutions. 
They are either unemployed or not engaged in any education or training 
activities – a problem the Ford Foundation referred to as a ‘social time 
bomb’ (Gower 2009). A large number of youth have been engaged in 
recent protest action in South African and discontent among the youth 
has been recognised as a key factor in the social unrest (Bernstein and 
Johnston 2007; Gower 2009). Youth were also at the forefront of many 
5 Habermas theorized the notion of the “public sphere” as a space where individuals 
could debate issues of public importance. This debate generated public opinion and 
attempted to articulate some of society’s most important issues. The importance of the 
public sphere is that it was a space between the state and the private realm in which 
citizens could participate (Habermas, 1989).
6 The National Youth Policy defines youth as anyone between the ages of 14 and 35 
years.
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of the xenophobic attacks that took place in South Africa during May 
2008 (Bekker, 2010). 
These events suggest that many youth are alienated from contemporary 
South African democratic political culture. Cognisant of this, this project 
investigates the ways in which various forms of media shape youth iden-
tity, how the media can contribute to the development of a youth civic 
identity to enable young people to become integrated into the demo-
cratic fabric of South African society and participate in its development. 
The focus on the media is important from both a liberal and radical per-
spective because of its potential to create a public space for discussion 
and dissent (Golding & Murdock, 2000; Dahlgren 2000). Most current 
theorising about the media’s (and particularly journalism’s) role in so-
ciety is based on Marshall’s (1964) theorising of citizenship. Murdock, 
for example, argues that journalism is judged by the extent to which it 
facilitates and promotes the various dimensions of citizenship outlined 
by Marshall, namely the civil, political, social and cultural rights which 
constitute citizenship as a particular identity (Murdock 1992: 20). The 
level of youth alienation implies that the media may not be playing this 
role sufficiently. This raises important questions about the impediments 
by the media to fulfilling this democratic function and whether the state 
is playing a facilitating role in this regard. To a large degree, the exercis-
ing of citizenship rights implies a responsibility on the part of citizens to 
become informed and to be media literate so that they can use the media 
to inform their civic actions (Firestone 2010).
Much of the research on youth and media has been conducted in the 
North7 and has shown that youth media consumption patterns are 
changing. For example, in Northern countries, television viewership has 
been declining for some time now. Youth interest in news and current 
affairs has been waning (Buckingham 1997; Costera Meijer 2006; Cos-
tera Meijer 2008) and youth appear to be increasingly drawn to partici-
patory media, especially mobile and Web 2.0-based social networking 
tools. In contrast, research by Strelitz (2002) on the South African media 
7 The Global North represents the economically developed societies of Europe, North 
America, the UK and Australia amongst others.
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indicates a strong coincidence between race, class and an interest in 
traditional sources of news. In South Africa, as in the rest of Africa, radio 
remains the most heavily consumed medium (SAARF 2009) but when 
it comes to the use of mobile communication, preliminary research in 
South Africa is contradictory. A pilot study conducted by Duncan (2013) 
indicated that mobile media were used by Black African working class 
youth for survival purposes (for example, checking for jobs), rather than 
for social networking, whereas preliminary unpublished research un-
dertaken by Schoon (2011) in the Hooggenoeg Coloured township of 
Grahamstown indicates a strong social networking aspect to the use of 
mobile phones.
The media can play an important role in enabling youth participation 
in the development of the country. This research investigates whether 
the media are, in fact, playing this enabling role. Youth need access to 
diverse media technologies and genres to ensure that they have mean-
ingful choices in what media they consume and how they exercise their 
voices. Ideally, they should be able to select from a range of different 
media that allow them to make sense of their lived context, think criti-
cally about their own life conditions, to re-imagine ways in which these 
conditions could be different, and to exercise their voices as citizens 
to give effect to these re-imaginings. However, South African society 
is characterised by uneven development and this is reflected in youth 
access to media. If youth voices are absent from South Africa’s devel-
opment agenda, or if more privileged youth are in a better position to 
shape public discourse on development issues, then those youth on the 
margins of society may be less able to influence the direction of society. 
This may lead to a reinforcement of uneven development and a contin-
ued marginalisation of the needs and aspirations of Black African work-
ing class and female youth. 
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LIteRAtURe ReVIeW
Introduction
We have used the following conceptual frameworks to illuminate our 
study: 
1. Youth
2. Citizenship
3. The public sphere: constituting youth as citizens
4. Media, youth, and politics
5. New media, youth and politics
Youth
From an international perspective, Ruthanne Kurth-Schai usefully iden-
tifies three distinct images of youth in contemporary theorising. On the 
one end of the spectrum, children/youth are seen as victims of adult 
society and in need of protection (1988: 114). On the other end, they 
are viewed as dangerous and in need of guidance or as a threat to adult 
society (see also Finn and Checkoway, 1998: 335). In between these two 
perspectives, youth are seen as incomplete, incompetent and in need of 
guidance - as “learners of adult society” (Kurth-Schai, 1988: 115). As a 
result, youth are confronted with “confusing and contradictory patterns 
of protection and pressure, with conflicting perceptions of their abili-
ties and inadequacies, rendering their social presence inconsequential 
and their social power invisible” (Kurth-Schai, 1988: 116). Kurth-Schai 
suggests that cultures in which children and youth undertake socially 
useful tasks produce “heightened self-esteem, enhanced moral develop-
ment, increased political activism, and the ability to create and maintain 
complex social relationships” (1988: 117). The recognition that children 
can perform important tasks such as nurturing (even of smaller siblings) 
is key to their capacity for “social insight and environment-shaping com-
petence” (Kurth-Schai, 1988: 116).
In South Africa, different, sometimes contradictory, terms have been 
used to describe its youth. The ‘Young Lions’ and ‘Lost Generation’ refer 
to Black African youth of the 1970s and 1980s (Boyce, 2012; Seekings, 
1996). Mattes (2011) suggests a broader historical typology: He divides 
the electorate into the Pre-apartheid Generation (those who reached 
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their formative years before the National Party came to power in 1948); 
the Early Apartheid Generation (those who turned 16 between 1948 
and 1960); the Grand Apartheid Generation (spanning formative years 
between 1960 and 1976 when apartheid was sedimented throughout 
South African life); the Struggle Generation (people who turned 16 be-
tween 1976 and 1996 during a time of continued political violence and 
resistance), and the Born Frees who entered adulthood and “came of age 
politically after 1996” (2011: 4), after South Africa’s first democratic 
elections.
“Beginning in 1997, a group of people began to move through 
the ages of 16, 17 and 18 and enter the political arena with 
little if any first-hand experience of the trauma that came be-
fore … their first political experience, possibly casting a vote 
in the 1999 election, was with a relatively normal, though 
clearly reform-minded democratic political system. While 
some backward looking dramas were still being played out, 
such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the order 
of the new day was forward-looking: massive state invest-
ment in construction of houses and other infrastructure, the 
transformation of the state, educational reform, and growth-
oriented economic development.” (Mattes, 2001: 4)
Based on studies by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) 
in 1998, and by Afrobarometer from 2000 to 2008, Mattes notes that 
the proportion of Born Frees has increased rapidly from 5% of eligible 
voters in 2000, to 31% in 2008. This cohort is now the second biggest 
segment of voters, just behind the Struggle Generation (43%). Signifi-
cantly, the Born Frees is 83% Black African and 43% urbanised. Despite 
the transformatory intentions of the ANC government, this generation 
suffers, just as previous generations did, from low levels of education, 
low levels of school completion and joblessness. Despite their coming of 
age in an era of political stability and change, they live with high levels 
of physical and material insecurity. These include “victimisation by cor-
rupt bureaucrats, exposure to crime, shortages of food or cash income, 
or the loss of friends or family to AIDS” (Mattes, 2011: 7). Mattes char-
acterises the lives of the Born Frees as “continuity rather than sharp 
generational change” (2011: 7).
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In an Afrobarometer study to test ‘demand for democracy’ and ‘demo-
cratic commitment’, Mattes finds an instrumentalist attitude among 
[South African] voters in judging the efficacy of democracy revolving 
around whether it delivers services and other benefits. Compared with 
other studies across Africa, Mattes claims that the features that predis-
pose other Africans towards a positive attitude to democracy are star-
tlingly absent in South Africa:
“The most striking result is the absence of any positive im-
pact of education, or of news media use, two findings very 
much at odds with what we know about other emerging Af-
rican democracies” (2011: 11).  
In addition, interactions with government officials or elected represen-
tatives are “generally negative”. These interactions alienate South Afri-
cans from democracy rather than ‘habituate’ them towards it”, and this, 
Mattes concludes, is particularly acute among the Born Free Generation 
(2011: 11-12). His overall conclusion is that the post-apartheid genera-
tion is less committed to democracy than their parents:
“… Whatever advantages might accrue from the new politi-
cal experiences of political freedom and a regular, peaceful, 
electoral process, are diminished by frustrating encounters 
with the political process, victimisation by corrupt officials, 
and enduring levels of unemployment and poverty” (2011: 
14).
This research echoes the findings of a 2005 Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC) report that “…there are in general low levels of par-
ticipation by young South Africans in organised activities” (HSRC, 2005: 
30). It notes that as much as 75.3% of the research sample has never 
participated in a community society or club. Evidence also seems to 
suggest that the South African youth are turning away from traditional 
forms of political participation such as voting as young people do not 
see the point of doing so (Matshiqi, 2011).
Boyce (2010) challenges these pessimistic views on the basis of an 
HSRC Social Attitudes Study dealing with youth. In Boyce’s view the 
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HSRC report indicates that a majority of youth do have faith in democ-
racy in South Africa and its social institutions but that they, along with 
other age groups, are dissatisfied with public service. Boyce does not 
feel that perceptions of their heightened dissatisfaction and disaffection 
are a correct portrayal (2010: 93). He proposes that the HSRC survey 
shows that despite their general experience of “low levels of life sat-
isfaction at present” Black African youth are generally more positive 
about various aspects of life in South Africa than Indians, Coloured and 
Whites (2010: 96). While acknowledging that race is still a major de-
terminant of attitude among South African youth Boyce suggests, “the 
general perception of disinterested and disillusioned youth seems to be 
incorrect and unfair in many instances. Results illustrate that it is often 
older respondents [the 25-35age group] who are more pessimistic. Fur-
ther, when youth are dissatisfied, their dissatisfaction appears to reflect 
wider national sentiment” (Boyce, 2010: 100).
Gerrit Kamper and Jo Badenhorst share Boyce’s view. Kamper and 
Badenhorst’s survey of 391 Black African adolescents (focusing on the 
impact of social change on Black African youth in post-apartheid South 
Africa) shows “a general spirit of optimism and independence exists, 
paired with a strong desire to escape the trappings of poverty and the 
inferiority of the past” (2010: 243). Drawing on other studies (Heaven 
et al, 2000; Everatt, 2002; Tyson and Stones, 2002; and Möller, 2005) 
they argue that despite their present circumstances many Black African 
youth have high expectations of a brighter future:
“Equal opportunity policies have raised expectations of job 
opportunities…black youth in general share the consumer-
ism of South Africa’s wealthy classes, but many lack the his-
tory of participation in the struggle or the ability to argue 
that current consumption is an extension of a reward for 
earlier political sacrifices. Although they might be politically 
aware and engaged, they are overwhelmingly not politically 
active to the extent their predecessors were” (Kamper and 
Badenhorst, 2010: 246).
Drawing on these and another study (Gaganakis, 2004) Kamper and 
Badenhorst claim that Black African youth do “feel empowered” (2010: 
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246). They propose that Black African youth in South Africa exhibit indi-
vidualism (evidenced by a desire to “pursue unique destinies and private 
satisfaction”), independence, a desire to use academic qualifications as 
an escape from working-class occupations and they aspire to jobs for-
merly reserved for Whites. Kamper and Badenhorst compare their own 
study to similar studies done in Europe (Alsaker and Flammer, 1999: 
Crocket and Sibereisen, 2000; and Larson et al, 2002) and show that in 
South Africa a major impediment faced by South African youth is societal 
instability. This is evident in the high levels of poverty (26.3% of South 
Africans were living below the food poverty line in 2008-20098), unem-
ployment (25.5% in 2012), HIV and AIDS (life expectancy for South Afri-
cans was 52 in 2010) and violent crime. In short, they argue that Black 
African youth “feel excited” about the future, and even though many live 
in “dismal circumstances” they believe these will change for the better. 
“It appears that a new generation of Black African youth is emerging, 
creating its own culture and style, and developing its own particular 
goals and social problems” (Kamper & Badenhorst, 2010: 255).
Citizenship
Citizenship describes the condition of one’s membership of a polity. Mar-
shall (1950) identifies three main dimensions that constitute citizenship 
as a particular social identity with associated rights and institutional 
means for securing them: the political, civil, social and cultural (Gold-
ing and Murdock, 1989:181; Murdock, 1992: 20; and Dahlgren, 2000: 
317). The first of these sets of rights is political rights, which ensures the 
rights of democratic participation in the exercise of political power. The 
second set of citizenship rights, civil rights, guarantee the individual’s 
freedom within ‘civil society’. Social rights secure members’ general life 
circumstances within the state, and refer to such areas as social security, 
welfare, education, health care etc. In other words, social rights refer to 
“the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and 
security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live 
the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in so-
8 This is the lowest category for poverty levels and amounts to R305 per month, “while 
roughly 38.9% and 52.3% were living below the lower-bound poverty line (R416) and 
the upper-bound poverty line (R577) respectively” (Statistics South Africa, 2012: 5).
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ciety” (Marshall, T.E. qtd. Murdock and Golding, 1989: 182). This range 
of rights was partly what the struggle for South African citizenship was 
about, and what was potentially signified by the 1994 elections.
More recently, the idea of ‘cultural citizenship’ has challenged the idea 
of citizenship as a “discourse of stability by which the modern state 
could achieve a degree of integration by compensating for the inequali-
ties of class” (Delanty, 2007: 1, quoting Marshall, 1950). Citizenship is 
now “part of the transformative discourses of contemporary society in 
which the problem of inclusion has become more acute” (Delanty, 2007: 
1). Delanty speaks about how (in particular referring to the UK and Aus-
tria); there is ‘governmentalisation’ of citizenship. In these terms citizen-
ship is understood to be a ‘cognitive competence’. Many governments 
now adopt a strategy “into which the individual as citizen is inserted” 
(Delanty, 2007: 3). Instead of citizenship referring to an existing identity 
of belonging to a polity, it is seen as one that is acquired: learning to 
become a citizen (Delanty, 2007). This view shifts the focus from mem-
bership to “common experiences, cognitive processes, forms of cultural 
translation and discourses of empowerment” which can take place in the 
informal context of everyday life and is influenced by the critical and 
formative events in people’s lives. Citizenship is therefore not just about 
rights and responsibilities, but also more importantly about capacity for 
action, the learning about the self and the relationship of the self and 
other. In Delanty’s view, citizenship is a quality of “identity and action” 
(2007).
Citizenship, says John Hartley, is a term that suggests ‘association among 
strangers’ (2010: 233). This association involves struggle, contestation 
over meanings and identities, differing power relations. Hartley argues 
further that strategies of inclusion and appropriations of citizenship are 
uneven and unequal. He takes issue with a static and universal under-
standing of citizenship, which denies that at the heart of this ‘associa-
tion’, is a discursive practice that grapples with the problem of how to 
reconcile strangers in “modern associated life” (2010: 234). Hartley 
points out that the term ‘citizen’ usurps the place of ‘subject’ and moves 
the power of the state from the monarch to the people. Hartley also pro-
poses that the state continues to monopolise the power to decide who 
“among those people count as citizens” (2010: 234).
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Hartley then turns to cultural citizenship as an idea which, when pro-
pounded by Toby Miller, is defined as ‘the right to know and speak’ in 
addition to ‘the right to reside and vote’ (political citizenship) and ‘the 
right to work and prosper’ (economic citizenship) (2010: 238 quoting 
Miller, 2006: 35). Cultural citizenship extends citizenship from public 
participation to social entitlements and “exposes the concept to chal-
lenge by its traditional opposite – the consumer” (Hartley 2010: 238).
“… Most people in affluent societies experience themselves 
as citizens and consumers, publics and audiences, workers 
and traders, all at once. Furthermore, it is now possible to 
express relational and identity associations, and to take ac-
tions and participate in collective decisions, through global 
commercial consumer culture. So citizenship as consump-
tion is startling to social theory, but lived by millions” (Hart-
ley, 2010: 238).
Hartley claims that social and digital media enable citizenship to include 
the following three features: play, the ability to self-organise, and to pro-
duce relational identities through changing and patterned relationships 
within communication systems. Play is the performative aspect of delib-
eration and participation that is not reduced to rationality, the comedic, 
competitive, entertaining, festive or body-centred. Self-organisation is 
possible because citizenship, in this sense, is discursive rather than nar-
rative. Apart from allowing individuals to self-organise, it also enables 
citizens to self-represent and construct for themselves what the associa-
tional relations among strangers will be. 
Hartley says the history of mediated communication since the nine-
teenth century shows how “completely civic engagement itself is ‘ab-
stracted’ from local and personal realities” (2010: 244). By contrast 
new media technologies make it possible for citizen-consumers to cre-
ate their own knowledge, their own self-representation and their own 
mutual relations. “Recognition of what’s needed for ‘healthy democratic 
functioning’ requires renewed attention to these demotic aspects of citi-
zenship” (Hartley, 2010: 245).
Based on research conducted in the UK (Nottingham) in 2005 and 2006 
22
based on New Labour’s attempt to ‘renew citizenship’, Hart shows how 
young people are posed in government policies as a ‘threat’ to democra-
cy. She poses that young people are treated as recipients for programmes 
of education and control about citizenship, and that paradoxically by 
making them the focus of such programmes as in need of ‘discipline 
and training’ they are alienated from a sense of inclusive citizenship 
(Hart, 2009: 643). Hart argues for a “broader definition of citizenship” 
that enables youth participation and enables them to express what they 
think their contributions could be. She argues for ‘cultural citizenship’ 
as an approach to citizenship, rather than the ‘highly normative’ concept 
defined by government policy in which the condition of citizenship is 
pre-determined and then policed through surveillance of behaviour that 
doesn’t conform (2009: 643). For cultural citizenship theorists, equal-
ity of citizenship is only realisable in a context where the experiences 
and views of citizens themselves, whatever their background, culture or 
social location, are recognised and respected (Hart, 2009: 645). Hart 
says a cultural citizenship approach acknowledges differences between 
young people, and that treating young people as a homogeneous group 
in need of ‘responsibilisation’ is the source of much of their negative 
experience of citizenship.
Another approach to citizenship is to view it from the perspective of 
civic engagement. Civic engagement can be located within the broader 
construct of social capital: a critical resource for positive social, emo-
tional, and intellectual development (Winter, 2003). Jobson (2011) 
notes the importance of building social capital through civic engage-
ment as a strategy for the development of youth leadership in South 
Africa. Many theorists argue that civic engagement (for example, par-
ticipation in clubs) is a vital and pre-requisite component of democratic 
practice, and that civically engaged youth are more likely to exhibit pro-
social behaviour (Winter, 2003; Galston, 2003; Flanagan and Levine, 
2010; Zaff, Boyd, Li, Learner and Learner, 2010; and Youniss, Bales, 
Christmas-Best, et al, 2002). The benefits of social capital and civic en-
gagement accrue from the view that social capital is a resource, like 
financial capital, that can be used to achieve a diverse range of per-
sonal or collective goals for the general development of communities 
(Putnam, 1993; Granovetter, 1973; Adler and Kwon, 2002; and Winter, 
2003). In South Africa where levels of unemployment and poverty are 
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high, especially among the youth, social capital and civic engagement 
become a necessity. The potential benefits of high social capital and 
civic engagement could positively impact on the abovementioned social 
challenges facing the country. 
Public sphere [media, popular culture]:  
Constituting youth as citizens
Habermas theorises the ‘public sphere’ as a common meeting point for 
the debate through which public opinion could be formed. Through par-
ticipation in such debate, citizens attempt to articulate some of society’s 
most pressing issues bridging the realms of the private and the state. 
As Garnham notes, Habermas’s concern was to find a way “to establish 
‘solidarity among strangers’” (2007: 203). For Habermas this entailed 
separating the private from the public, and establishing a mode of dis-
course – ‘rational critical debate’ – through which citizens could thrash 
out issues of public concern. The public sphere could be seen as a site 
through which the state is put in touch with the needs of society and 
as a regulatory institution against the authority of the state (Habermas, 
1989: 31; Garnham, 2007: 206). In the digital age, the ‘public sphere’ 
concept has been used to describe the internet as a ‘cyberspace’, ‘global 
public sphere’ (Sparks, 2001) and a ‘virtual public sphere’ (Papacharissi, 
2004).  
Habermas’s theorisation has come under much criticism especially with 
regards to its perceived neglect of issues such as gender, class and age 
(Fraser, 1992; Negt and Kluge, 1972). It has also been criticised for side-
lining the role of alternative media (Schudson, 1997; Dahlgren, 2007; 
Buckingham, 1997; and Gitlin, 1998), ignoring the existence of ‘coun-
ter-public spheres’ and multiple public spheres (‘sphericules’) (Dahlgren, 
2007; Gitlin, 1998), disregarding ‘dissensus’ and the agency of audiences. 
Equally important for this study is the critique of Habermas’s assumption 
that the public sphere fosters rational deliberation. This assumption ig-
nores Bakhtinian notions of dissimilarity, dialogical engagement and ‘car-
nival and spectacle’ (Gardiner, 2004: 30). The concept of the alternative 
public sphere is most relevant here because it allows one to explore how 
youth creatively appropriate and adapt new media such as Facebook and 
mobile phones to construct identities – potentially as citizens. 
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Another position regarding the public sphere debate is to look at virtual 
spaces in terms of popular culture instead of the Habermasian concept 
of rational debate. Popular culture is defined here in terms of its op-
position to power: ‘The people versus the power bloc’ rather than ‘class 
against class’ (Hall, 1981: 238). Conceptualising social media – which 
allow different kinds of people to interact as ‘produsers’ (producers + 
consumers) (Bruns, 2007) – as popular culture offers a ‘way out’ of the 
theoretical impasse between critics and advocates of the public sphere. 
Alternative media, as part of the alternative public sphere, is defined as 
“a gamut of media forms that offers the means for democratic commu-
nication to people who are normally excluded from media production” 
(Atton, 2002: 4). Alternative media also enable oppositional groups to 
advance their political goals (Pickard, 2007; Dockney et al, 2010: 77; 
and Couldry, 2003). Extending this argument, studies on the subaltern, 
drawing on Gramsci’s work on popular culture and hegemony, have 
lauded the role of popular forms of media in constituting an alternative 
public sphere especially for subaltern and marginalised groups in soci-
ety (Willems, 2011). This echoes James C. Scott’s (1976) theorisation 
of everyday forms of resistance9 and Gluckman’s ‘Rituals of rebellion’10, 
which allow one to account for hidden transcripts relating to the critique 
of power that ‘goes on offstage’ and which power elites cannot decode. 
This is a useful way of thinking about youth protest (and different con-
cepts of citizenship) as it departs from the narrow definition of resistance 
and related identities referring to physical and material protests in the 
streets, to include a set of practices used by the dominated to challenge 
those who make attempts to dominate them (Willems, 2010: 4). 
Media, youth, and politics
Research into the relationships between youth, media, and politics does 
not present a clear-cut picture. For example, although research shows 
that youth who read newspapers and consume media are more likely 
to engage in various kinds of civic activities (Buckingham, 1997; Lopez 
9 In his book ‘Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of resistance’, Scott (1985) argues 
oppression and resistance are in flux and that by focusing too much on events such as 
organised rebellion, we miss subtle but powerful forms of “everyday resistance”.
10 This work by Gluckman (1952) recounts his theory that ceremonies among tribes in 
South-East Africa strongly express social tension.
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et al, 2006; and Amadeo, Torney-Purta & Barber, 2004), many North-
ern scholars argue there is no longer a straightforward, unambiguous 
interrelationship between watching or reading the news, civic iden-
tity and social identity among young people (Barnhurst and Wartella, 
1998; Buckingham, 1999; Beekhoven & Van Wel, 1998; Katz, 1993; 
Livingstone, 2002). Chaffee & Yang (1990: 141) argue that ‘television-
dependent citizens’ can hardly be seen as citizens at all as they are less 
likely to vote, understand political processes, and be involved in politics 
(quoted in Buckingham, 1997: 346). This raises questions about the sa-
lience of the consumption of particular media to political engagement. 
Putnam (1995 & 2000), and more recently Mindich (2005), suggest 
that the marginal significance of news and current affairs programmes 
in the lives of Northern youth is indicative of their limited social involve-
ment. On the basis of research in the Netherlands, Costera Meijer (2006, 
2008) and Drok (2009) conclude that young people’s interest in news is 
still indicative of their social engagement but does not impact on their 
actual news use. In other words it appears that for some Northern youth, 
the informative function of news and media is becoming secondary to 
their communicative function (Costera Meijer, 2008). A driving concern 
about the relationship between youth, media and civic engagement is 
the finding by the Times Mirror (1990) study that suggests young peo-
ple who are not well-informed politically may fall prey to ‘blind faith’ in 
political leaders (p345).  
Other research on youth culture challenges this pessimistic view. Re-
searchers have indicated that adolescents’ views are mediated by their 
relationships with peers and parents, and they therefore argue it is not 
just youth media consumption that is important, but whether and how 
youth discuss the ideas they get from the media with their peers and 
family (Boyd et al, 2011). These researchers argue for the critical im-
portance of ‘communication competence’ (Shah, McLeod & Lee, 2009; 
McLeod, Shah, Hess, Lee, 2010). This competence ‘includes media use 
(with focus on public affairs news consumption) and interpersonal com-
munication (discussion of public affairs and politics with others), as un-
derpinning civic competence’ (Boyd et al, 2011: 1169). These communi-
cative abilities are described by civic scholars such as Battistoni (2000) 
and Kirlin (2003) as an ‘important aspect of civic development and criti-
cal for effective civic participation’ (Boyd et al, 2011: 1169).
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Given the complexity of the relationship between youth, media and civic 
engagement, it is helpful to unpack some of the key issues that have 
been raised through research. A key argument that underpins this re-
lationship is the link between ‘information’, often associated with ‘hard 
news’ and political involvement. A fundamental question is whether be-
ing informed enhances public ability to fulfil democratic responsibili-
ties. Delli Carpini & Keeter (1996) think this is the case, but Lupia & 
McCubbins (1998) argue that citizens don’t need much knowledge to 
fulfil their duties as citizens. The existing research centres on a debate 
about the relevance of traditional forms of news media to today’s youth, 
as they attempt to relate broader political events to their everyday lives 
(Katz, 1992; Buckingham, 1997; and Costera Meijer, 2006). Bucking-
ham (1997) links these concerns to Habermas’s notion of the public 
sphere, which underpins traditional notions of journalism and its con-
tribution to democratic culture. However, in order to achieve this social 
engagement in the public sphere, Habermas privileges ‘rational critical 
debate’ – a position which has been critiqued, as discussed earlier in this 
report.  
Buckingham (1997) is critical of the ‘rigid distinction between the pub-
lic and private’ in which there is no place “for the ‘irrational’ side of 
language, for rhetoric or narrative, nor indeed for aesthetics, for cer-
emony, or ritual, indeed, for precisely those elements which character-
ise popular cultural forms” (1997: 354-355; see also Fraser, 1990; and 
Costera Meijer, 2001). Yet, it is precisely these ‘irrational’ forms, and the 
new communications technologies that enable them, to which Northern 
youth are attracted. Baum (2002, 2003) shares this view and argues 
that so-called ‘soft news’, which is ‘typically more sensational, more per-
sonality-centred, less time-bound, more practical, more incident-based 
than other news’ (Patterson, 2000: 4), is a way of attracting viewers to 
issues – such as foreign policy – they may not otherwise be concerned 
about. Baum does acknowledge Prior’s research, which found that soft 
news, is “unlikely to be consistently associated with increases in general 
factual knowledge about politics” (Baum, 2003: 174). In contrast, Pat-
terson (2000) argues that ‘hard news’ is still important, but that ‘soft 
news’ and what he calls ‘critical journalism’ is a turn-off for viewers 
and both, in different ways, are weakening democracy. Patterson argues 
that people who prefer ‘hard news’ are heavier consumers of news than 
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those who prefer soft news, and that the trend towards soft news has 
contributed to the decline in news consumption (2000). In addition, Pat-
terson suggests that critical journalism – what Barnett (2002) describes 
as ‘journalism’s disdain for politics’ – has weakened people’s interest in 
politics and their interest in news (Patterson, 2000: 2).
From this Northern research it appears that many topics in routine 
news programmes and so-called quality newspapers are not appealing, 
and staples like domestic politics, international politics, culture and the 
economy are of least interest to young people.  
Jenkins’ argument about convergence culture11, and Couldry’s use of 
the term ‘mediation’12 point to the complex ways in which content flows 
between different media and genres in the new media environment. This 
offers opportunities for youth consumers to become producers of mean-
ing, with an attendant shift in their identities. This is consistent with 
Hall’s view of the construction of identity in post-modernity.
The Northern debates about youth engagement with media are about 
the extent to which popular new technologies such as online or mobile 
social networking should be used to engage the youth around issues that 
are meaningful to them, and in this way possibly foster a civic identity 
that could potentially enable their participation in social/political life. 
This is relevant given the recognition that these new media technolo-
gies enable the constitution of ‘public sphericules’13 (Gitlin 1998), which 
may enhance participation in public life as intermediate spaces in which 
aspects of democratic citizenship are developed (see Curran 2000).
11 Jenkins explores this theme in his book ‘Convergence Culture: Where Old and New 
Media Collide’, which examines the relationships between media convergence, culture 
and collective intelligence (2008).
12 Couldry regards mediation as the “variety of dynamics within media flows” (2008: 
380) and argues that mediation is the relationship between media production and what 
flows back into social and cultural life.
13 Gitlin argues that because society has become so multicultural, fragmented and 
complex we can no longer speak of one public sphere, but that there are numerous 
public sphericules which are emerging.
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new media, youth and politics
The use of the internet and new media to mobilise the youth and other 
politically active citizens to engage in alternative political activity fol-
lows the premise made by many politicians and researchers who regard 
new media as a means through which to capture this ‘apathetic’ and 
non-participatory group. There are examples of British politicians us-
ing the internet to connect with their constituencies (Gibson & Ward, 
1998), governments using mobile phones to encourage voting (Dale & 
Strauss, 2009) and using the internet as a key source of information 
provision (Xenos & Moy, 2007). The assumption is that the internet is 
an alternative means to engage and connect with young people because 
young people are not engaging in traditional political activity as a result 
of not consuming traditional mass media. Carpini (2000) cites research 
that found 70% of young people between 18 and 25 years regarded the 
internet as a source of valuable political information. He adds that “what 
these technologies seem clearly to provide is access to young adults, an 
increased ability for organized interests to more effectively reach young 
adults, and new or easier opportunities for already engaged (and per-
haps interested but not yet engaged) young adults to participate and do 
so more effectively” (2000: 348).
The question is whether the internet and new media are mobilizing 
young people to engage in traditional political action and civic duties. 
Researchers and theorists regard the issue from within two camps – the 
optimistic and the pessimistic. The optimists believe the internet and 
new media will enable more democratic engagement because it lowers 
the cost of communicating about politics and political activity, it lowers 
the cost of being associated with organisations which engage in politi-
cal activity and it makes participation cheaper and easier (Rheingold, 
2000). The pessimists argue the internet plays no significant role in 
changing political behaviour (Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Sustein, 2005). 
Despite the pessimism, the general trend towards engagement of youth 
on the web does suggest it is a tool for promoting participation in politi-
cal and civic action. Montgomery et al argue, “the Web is already inte-
grated into most young people’s window on the world, and that it offers 
them a broader perspective than any before” (2004: 126). These as-
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sumptions, coupled with a declining rate of youth participation, means 
that there seems to be a juncture between internet usage and recap-
turing the ‘wayward’ youth. Coleman argues that “observing that very 
young people who are mostly politically alienated and disengaged are 
the most active users of the internet, it is argued that if the interactive 
features of the internet were used to encourage young people to civic 
and political activities this might serve to overcome traditional barriers 
to participation” (2007: 258). Research suggests that the internet is a vi-
able tool for engaging youth in political activity. The internet is also able 
to capture the attention of the youth and encourage them to participate 
in civic and political life (Iyengar & Jackman, 2004). Research by Wal-
ton & Donner (2011) suggest that mobile communications can be used 
in the same way as the internet to engage young people in political ac-
tion and voting during elections. Their research provides evidence that 
the mobile internet, the use of SMS and social networking tools such 
as MXit can be key factors in mobilizing young people during election 
periods.
Research on the use of Facebook as a particular medium of social com-
munication amongst youth has provided mixed results (Pew Research 
Centre 2011; Boyd, 2008). Cyber-optimists have branded social media 
the ‘new vessel’ of cyber-democracy and a ’tool of political freedom’, 
which enables social movements and activists to reinvigorate democrat-
ic processes (Downing, 2001). Clay Shirky, a cyber-optimist, sees new 
media technologies as having the potential to ’organise, plan, and co-
ordinate direct political actions – elections, demonstrations and insur-
rections’ (2011). In response, cyber-pessimists like Malcolm Gladwell 
(2010) dismiss social media activism as based on weak ties and there-
fore limited to low-risk participation. Evgeny Mozorov adds that social 
media are affecting the world “but it also looks like the other side – the 
authoritarian governments – are getting empowered as well” (2011: 5). 
Despite this seemingly endless theoretical debate, new media technolo-
gies such as SMS messages and mobile media have been seen as enabling 
activism worldwide (Kellner, 2002: 182; Fuchs 2006: 293, Nyamnjoh, 
2009; Moyo, 2010; Ekine, 2010; Willems, 2010; Atwood, 2009; Ndlela, 
2009; Neumayer and Raffl, 2008; Makinen and Kuira, 2008). Online 
social networks are believed to have played a key role in recent demo-
cratic revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt (Joseph, 2011; González-Bailón, 
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2011), leading to the coinage of the concept ‘Twitter/ Facebook Revolu-
tions’ (Christensen, 2011; Bohler-Muller and Van der Merwe, 2011). So-
cial network sites such as Facebook, Twitter and BlackBerry Messenger 
have been used by the Occupy Movement in the United States (Sassen, 
2011), protesters in the 2011 London riots (Bright, 2011) and rioters 
in ‘Occupy Nigeria’ (Fripp, 2012) to facilitate and coordinate political 
activity. This fuelled debates on the relationship between social network 
sites and political action. 
Internet access and usage figures in South Africa are difficult to deter-
mine but some research estimates them at 20% (World Wide Worx), 
which makes it one of the least used means of communication and infor-
mation gathering in the country, heavily outweighed by radio (77%) and 
television (69%) (RIA Household Survey, 2008). More recent research 
has suggested this figure might be higher, with one third of South Af-
ricans accessing the internet daily (de Lanerolle, 2012). What is sig-
nificant about this number is that the researchers suggest 84% of these 
users access the internet through their mobile phone, with only 18% 
accessing through a computer.   While fixed internet may not hold out 
much hope as a means of mobilizing young South Africans to engage in 
political action, perhaps holding greater potential is the mobile phone, 
which has high penetration, and usage rates. With mobile phone access 
at around 83% (RIA household survey, 2008), the potential for reaching 
young South Africans via their mobile phones is a possibility.
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MetHoDoLoGY
The study uses qualitative and quantitative research methods to provide 
information about general trends, as well as more nuanced perceptions 
of the relationship between media consumption and usage, and civic 
identity and engagement of South African youth. These data provide 
an assessment of the media genres that most commonly raise issues af-
fecting youth. The data also examine which media are perceived to be 
more conducive for enabling youth voices to be heard and responded to. 
These methods further provide research data for how the media assist 
in the construction of civic identity and enhance potential for youth par-
ticipation. The research tools were also constructed to establish whether 
media policy promotes youth participation in the public sphere. 
The quantitative methods include survey questionnaires and media con-
tent analysis. The qualitative methods include focus groups discussions 
with young people and an analysis of youth policy in South Africa. The 
methods and rationales for particular methodological choices have re-
flected those used by the project’s Dutch partners (Irene Costera Mei-
jer and Nico Drok) in a similar project conducted in the Netherlands 
in 200914. While the Dutch study provided excellent tools, which were 
used for the South African study, the researchers were also conscious 
of the different contexts in which the studies were undertaken, and this 
was taken into account in the South African research. The findings of 
the South African project combined with the Dutch research provide an 
international comparative dimension to the findings.
The key objective of the study was to investigate trends in youth me-
dia consumption and usage. Four provinces – Gauteng, Eastern Cape, 
Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal – were chosen for a combination of 
reasons. The provinces are the four most populated provinces in South 
Africa (Census 2011). Two of the provinces are uniquely representative 
of particular historical classifications of the South African population: 
Coloured people form the majority of the population in the Western 
14 The Dutch project report is available at: http://www.windesheim.nl/~/media/Files/
Windesheim/Research%20Publications/111006_DrokSchwarz20Jongerennieuwsme-
diabetrokkenheid20compleet.pdf
32
Cape (Hendricks, 2005: 118) and the majority of Indian South Africans 
live in KwaZulu-Natal. According to ASSA (Actuarial Society of South 
Africa, 2000) KwaZulu-Natal is divided along racial lines in the follow-
ing way – 84.9% Black African, 1.5% Coloured, 8.5% Indian and 2.4% 
White15. A practical consideration for choosing the locations was the 
fact that at least one contributor to the project were based in each of 
the provinces.
Quantitative surveys were conducted with 956 young people, between 
15 and 30 years of age across the four sites16. Because the research was 
conducted across a number of different sites in the provinces there was 
no sampling frame for the populations of the specific sites. Instead, the 
quota sampling method was used which allows for a representation of 
population at each particular site. Random sampling was excluded as 
a method of data collection because it was not possible to effectively 
and scientifically sample the population in a random way in any of the 
sites. Furthermore, many researchers argue that besides the savings in 
time and money, a well-designed quota sample should be at least as 
representative as a random sample and is therefore legitimate to use for 
making statistical inferences (Kruskali & Mosteller, 1979;  Yule, Udney 
& Kendall, 1950). While quota sampling should be representative of the 
broader population, depending on which characteristics of the target 
population are chosen as key indicators, this may not always be possi-
ble. This was the case in this study as a result of the characteristics cho-
sen to categorise the sample. Due to the fact that South Africans are still 
strongly influenced by race17, race was chosen as a key variable. One of 
the challenges is, that in many places quotas for races other than Black 
African would have been challengingly small and would have made the 
quota difficult to work with when other characteristics (namely gender, 
age, and education) were added to race. It is for this reason that the 
quota sample in this study is not a strict reflection of the population 
classifications at the wider national or provincial level. It is also for this 
15 http://www.sahealthinfo.org/bod/kwazulunatal.pdf
16 See Appendix One for survey questionnaire administered to participants.
17 “Race” has historically been used as a defining characteristic in South Africa. Be-
cause of the historic legacy of a race-based system such as Apartheid, there are still 
social, political and economic differences between people of different races.
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reason that KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape were key sites for 
the survey because of their proportionately larger populations of the 
smaller race categories.
Just over 87% (87.2%) of respondents were between 15 and 30 years 
old, with only 12.8% above 31 years. The information therefore shows 
a bias towards younger respondents. These numbers reflect one of the 
challenges of quota sampling: those administering the questionnaires 
may not always stick to the quotas as stringently as required (Babbie, 
2013). There was a fair gender balance across respondents with 50.8% 
female respondents and 49.2% male respondents. As mentioned, race is 
a significant factor in South Africa because it is still a determining factor 
for many life trajectories. While the Dutch study did not use race as a 
variable for the quota sample, the researchers of the South African study 
felt that race could not be disregarded in this study. As a result of Apart-
heid conditions of different race groups in South Africa are different. 
To evaluate media use and consumption, and the relationship between 
media use and civic identity it was important to consider the impact of 
racial categories.
Respondents were asked to categorise themselves according to the his-
torical race categories (Black, Coloured, Indian, and White)18. Respon-
dents consisted of Black African, 57% (2011 national figures, 80%), Co-
loured, 13% (2011 national figures, 9%), Indian, 11% (2011 national 
figures, 2.5%), and White, 6% (2011 national figures, 9%). Due to the 
relatively small numbers of Indian and Coloured respondents and be-
cause there were no significant differences in responses across ques-
tions for these two categories they have been grouped together in the 
results. This is to ensure that results are easy to read and to ensure that 
the most significant results can be included in the report without mak-
ing it too extensive.
Considering the age of the respondents, it is not surprising that just 
under one third of respondents (31%) were still in school (called learn-
ers throughout the report). Almost four out of ten (23%) were studying 
18 These figures do not correspond with national figures as a result of the quota sam-
pling method used – see previous explanation.
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at either a college or university (called students throughout the report). 
Just more than one out of ten (12%) respondents said they were un-
employed. This is well below the official 2012 national figure of 25.5% 
(Statistics South Africa). More than three out of ten (34%) said they were 
either in full time employment (23%) or that they were employed part 
time (11%). These figures could reflect the fact that a number of sur-
veys and focus groups were administered in sites close to universities 
or other tertiary institutions. 
This survey generated the expected large amount of data. This report 
will focus on results that are regarded as significant and relevant to the 
focus of the study: consumption and use of the media by the youth for 
the purpose of constituting civic identity and political participation. Key 
correlations were made considering the following variables: race, age, 
education, location, income, school type and occupation. Each of these 
variables include a number of categorisations:
• Race: Black African, White, Indian/Coloured
• Age: 15-20 years old, 21-30 years old, 31 or more years
• Education: none/little schooling, Grade 12, tertiary education
• Location: large city, small town, rural area
• Income: less than R1500, between R1501 – R3300, between R3301 
– R9000, between R9001 – R21 000, more than R21 001
• School type: township, ex-Model C19/private school, other
• Occupation: unemployed, scholar, student, employed
Some variables produced analytical challenges. These include school 
type. Respondents who provided ‘other’ as school type but did not pro-
vide further details regarding the school. Almost 50% (46.5%) of respon-
dents stated that they attend an ex-Model C or private school and 41.3% 
19 During apartheid there were separate departments responsible for White children’s 
schools, Black African children’s schools and Coloured children’s schools. The House 
of Representatives (HOR) was the department that handled coloured children’s school-
ing, the Department of Education and Training (DET) handled Black African children’s 
schooling and the White children’s schools were known as Model C Schools. Even today, 
Model C schools still typically have better facilities, better teachers and better educa-
tional opportunities for children than township or rural schools (http://www.my-cape-
town-south-africa.com/south-african-schools-and-education-system.html)
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attend township schools. Location was another variable which proved 
challenging. Results show indistinct differences between the categories 
small town and rural area (and could perhaps have been grouped to-
gether for purposed of analysis).  Cross tabulations within these key 
variables have been included in the study only where significant asso-
ciations occurred in the results. These results are based on the Pearson 
Chi-Square test, where a p-value of less than 0.05 indicates a significant 
association between the variables.
Media Tenor conducted a quantitative content analysis of the kind of 
media coverage of the youth in both print and broadcast (television 
only) media in South Africa. A total of 8736 articles were analysed from 
South African print media between January 2011 and July 2012. Arti-
cles were chosen on the basis of whether they had youth as the subject. 
Each article is analysed for the following variables: 
• Who/what is the subject
• what is the field of business of the subject
• where does the action take place
• what time does the statement refer to
• what topic is the statement about
• who is the source of the statement
• and the tone or value of the statement (whether it is negative, posi-
tive or neutral). 
Print media analysed were: Beeld, Business Day, Business Report, Busi-
ness Times, Cape Times, City Press, Daily Dispatch, Daily Sun, Die Burg-
er, FinWeek, Financial Mail, Isolezwe, Mail & Guardian, New Age, Rap-
port, Sake24, Sowetan, Star, Sowetan, Star, Sunday Independent, Sunday 
Times, Times, Witness. Broadcast media analysed were the following 
news broadcasts, all on television: SABC 3 News @ One, E-TV News, Afri-
kaans News, SABC 2, English News, SABC 3, Zulu/Xhosa News, SABC 1, 
Sotho News, SABC 2, KykNet (Afrikaans), SiSwati/Ndebele News, SABC 
1, SABC 3 news @ 10 and SABC 3 Africa News Update.
Focus groups discussions were then conducted in three provinces in 
South Africa: Gauteng, Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal. In total 14 fo-
cus group discussions were conducted with a total of 107 participants 
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across the demographic range: unemployed/employed (full time and 
part time), students (full time and part time), young people living in rural 
and urban areas, and participants across all racial categories. The pur-
pose of the focus group discussions was to gain a deeper understanding 
of young people’s perceptions of community, civic and political engage-
ment, media use, and attitudes towards the media in relation to political 
and civic engagement. Participants for the focus groups were selected 
through purposive sampling, as well as snowball sampling. Focus group 
studies in media research rarely seek to obtain focus groups represen-
tative of the population. Rather, focus groups are selected according to 
dimensions that may be significant to the way in which people use and 
interpret media. For this project, the choice of focus group participants 
was shaped by the results of the survey and participants were identified 
based on criteria drawn from the survey results such as age, location, 
gender, race, and occupation. Different moderators conducted the fo-
cus groups in KwaZulu-Natal using a different moderator’s guide and 
moderating procedures than the moderators in Gauteng and the Eastern 
Cape. This posed analytical challenges despite similarities in the general 
objectives of conducting the focus groups.
A qualitative policy analysis was also conducted to provide an overview 
of South African youth policies. The particular focus was to analyse 
whether general youth policy and specific media policy promote active 
youth participation in the public sphere. Researchers analysed the Na-
tional Youth Policy 2009-2014, the Children’s Act, the Films and Publi-
cations Act, and the Media Development and Diversity Agency Act. The 
aim of the policy analysis is to allow the research to make policy recom-
mendations based on key focus areas identified by the government. This 
policy analysis will be related to the key findings of the study and allow 
for recommendations for better youth engagement and participation in 
the public sphere through the media.
37
FInDInGs
The findings are collated in relation to information from the surveys, 
the focus group discussions, the content analysis and in comparison 
with the research conducted by the Dutch partners. The findings will be 
discussed within the following categories: 
1. Media coverage on the youth 
2. Media use
3. Media and institutional trust
4. Civic identity and the media 
5. Civic engagement and the media
Media coverage on the youth
This report is aimed at identifying trends of reporting on the youth as 
well as issues most closely associated with young people. The analysis 
focuses on reportage on organisations and programmes concerned with 
youth development. The analysis also examines political coverage on 
youth. 
Traditional media became increasingly negative towards issues associ-
ated with the youth during 2012. Coverage on the youth was linked to 
concern regarding societal challenges in general. Growing pertinence 
was given to unemployment, inequality as well as the situation of the 
poor. Major contributors towards negative focus on the youth was the 
ousting of Julius Malema as ANCYL leader, the quality of, and access to, 
education as well as growing concern regarding social unrest as a result 
of disillusionment on the part of unemployed youths. 
In general, there is an unbalanced representation of youth in the media 
based on population statistics from Statistics South Africa 2011. Based 
on these figures there is an unbalanced trend of reporting on gender 
with young males receiving almost 20% more interest than young wom-
en. Analysis of long-term media trends indicates that the share of cover-
age on women is subsiding over time. 
Media reportage of various race groups is also unbalanced. According to 
38
Statistics South Africa’s population estimates for 2011 there are 8.64% 
Coloureds and 9.09% Whites currently living in South Africa, Yet White 
young people receive more than twice the amount of coverage when 
compared with coverage of Coloured youth.
Figure 1
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Issue coverage on the youth
education
The media took greatest interest in challenges faced by the youth and 
issues that were either contributing to, or were as a result of, inequality 
and social circumstances. The media were particularly focused on edu-
cation seen as – the key to alleviating poverty and inequality.
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Education received growing negative attention during 2012. Three in-
cidents gave rise to growing media perceptions that education is facing 
a crisis:
• The stampede at the University of Johannesburg during the be-
ginning of 201220. The issue highlighted the shortage of space at 
institutions of higher learning in South Africa. The Daily Maverick 
(10/01/2012) reported: “It was not too hard to figure out there would 
be a lot of tense people at UJ on Tuesday. South Africa’s university 
system has room for 150,000 first-year students. One-hundred-and-
eighty-thousand matriculants whose results qualify them for further 
study won’t get a place”. 
• The Eastern Cape education crisis since 201121 focused increased 
20  On the 10th January 2012 one person was killed outside of the University of Johan-
nesburg in a stampede of more than 10 000 people. The woman was the mother of a 
prospective student who had been standing in queues with her son, along with the other 
thousands, in the hope of registering for the new academic year.
21  The Eastern Cape Province has been plagued by a number of challenges in the edu-
cation sector. These include strikes by teachers over pay, shortage of teachers for key 
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media awareness on ailing education standards. Much debate per-
tained to Helen Zille’s ‘educational refugees’ utterance22.
• The Limpopo book scandal23 caused a media outcry. The focus on 
the textbook scandal in Limpopo was responsible for a spike in nega-
tive coverage on education for the South African government during 
the third quarter. A relatively stable rating for most of 2011 was 
derailed by persistent coverage on Limpopo.
Unemployment and the social situation of youths
Social unrest
Unemployment and the social situation of the youth received intensified 
debate. Media scrutiny of the issue was fuelled by strong support for 
former ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema’s aggressive stance on 
the nationalisation of key industries (particularly mining and banks) as 
well as land reform. The increased violence associated with protests and 
strikes intensified concern of a looming social uprising. General Secre-
tary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), Zwelinzima 
Vavi, a prominent source on social unrest, reportedly argued that the in-
crease in violent public protests in the country was the beginning of an 
uprising. He stated that unemployment – especially unemployment of 
the youth in SA – was a ticking time bomb and that social programmes 
such as the Expanded Public Works Programme and the social grants 
system that benefited 15 million people were not enough and were not 
a viable solution (Business Day, 07/06/2012).
The Youth Wage Subsidy
The Youth Wage Subsidy24 received extensive media debate during 2012. 
subjects, poor infrastructure, and calls for the dismissal of the Eastern Cape head of 
education Modidma Mannya,
22  In April 2012 Democratic Alliance leader, Helen Zille, who is also Premier of the 
Western Cape, called learners from the Eastern Cape who move to the Western Cape 
with the purpose of gaining better education, “education refugees”.
23  In June 2012 the media reported that Grade 10 pupils in the Limpopo province 
had still not received textbooks which were scheduled to be delivered in January. This 
became a national scandal because the national education department had taken over 
running the provincial education department in December of the year before.
24  In 2011 the Treasury suggested a subsidy for employers who take on first-time 
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Much interest focused on the fact that Cosatu had opposed the subsidy. 
Cosatu claimed the subsidy would aid profitability levels of enterprises 
at the expense of workers. The trade union also argued the government 
would be unable to monitor whether the subsidy would be used for the 
intended purposes (The Mail & Guardian, 20/06/2012). It was reported 
that the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
strongly supported the subsidy. The youth subsidy received heightened 
levels of interest when DA and Cosatu supporters were involved in street 
battles, as the DA tried to march to Cosatu House to highlight Cosatu’s 
opposition to the scheme. The media criticised the ANC’s ‘deafening si-
lence’ regarding Cosatu’s violent reaction against the DA’s march (The 
Mail & Guardian, 16/05/2012). The ANC and government received in-
tensified scrutiny when they seemed to have backpedalled on the youth 
wage subsidy so as to win back Cosatu’s favour. Journalists said: “Until 
consensus is reached, unemployed youth will remain a political football” 
(Daily Maverick 23/11/2012). 
Figure 3
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Health
Regarding health issues, the media focused most extensively on HIV. 
The press were particularly focused on the prevention of HIV; less inter-
est pertained to the prevalence of the virus. The media were particularly 
critical of the commonness of teenage pregnancies as well as substance 
workers in a two year programme which aimed to improve employment nationally. The 
Youth Wage Subsidy was to be implemented in April 2012, but had been stalled due to 
discussion between relevant parties and organisations.
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abuse. Substance abuse was closely linked to the contraction of HIV as 
well as the incidence of crime.
Figure 4
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Crime
The youth received much reportage in connection with crime – most no-
ticeably violent contact crimes such as sexual assault and murder. The 
sexual assault of a mentally-handicapped girl caused a media outcry and 
resulted in increased media debate on societal elements that contribute 
to the youth committing such violent acts. To this effect, director of the 
Medical Research Council’s Gender & Health Unit Rachel Jewkes was 
quoted as saying: “Parental absence was significantly associated with 
raping, as was the quality of affective relationship with parents related 
to raping. Experiences of bullying and being bullied were much more 
common among men who raped” (City Press, 22/04/2012).
News that a minor had admitted to killing the former leader of the right-
wing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), Eugene Terre’Blanche not 
only resulted in intensified focus on murder, but also stimulated me-
dia interest regarding claims that young people were exploited as farm 
workers. 
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Coverage on organisations or programmes focused on youth  
development
The organisations or programmes aimed at youth development received 
either much scrutiny or a dearth of media interest. The mismanagement 
of funds as well as a failure to meet expectations was at the heart of 
media concern.
The National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) has been shrouded 
in controversy since its inception in 2009. NYDA received much nega-
tive attention during November 2011 as it was reported that ousted 
ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema “astutely placed many of his 
Youth League allies in lucrative positions within (NYDA)” (Cape Times, 
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17/11/2011). Questions regarding exorbitant salaries during March 
2012 perpetuated beliefs that the NYDA is a ‘fat cat’ organisation 
plagued by nepotism. The media quoted DA Youth leader Makashule 
Gana as saying that: “We have known for a long time that the ANC Youth 
League-aligned national NYDA board is running an employment agency 
for pals. It is only now that we can see just how focused on staffing, to 
the exclusion of real youth development, the NYDA board is – to the 
point that its plans are simply nonsensical” (News24; 14/03/2012). Op-
position parties again called for the National Youth Development Agen-
cy to be disbanded during September after its annual report revealed 
irregular expenditure of R133 million during the past financial year.
The Department for Women Children and People with Disabilities (DW-
CPD) has consistently attracted negative focus. The department received 
renewed scrutiny during August due to the fact that the DA had asked 
Public Protector Thuli Madonsela to investigate the department’s failure 
to deliver on its mandate.
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Coverage on political parties’ youth divisions
Analysis of political coverage associated with the youth indicates that 
the media agenda mostly centre on issues of importance to the ANC 
Youth League. The ousting of former ANCYL leader Julius Malema25 is 
a pertinent example. The media show little interest in the youth wings 
of opposition parties. Not only was the ANC Youth League most in focus, 
but the League also achieved the greatest share of coverage when look-
ing at the total amount of coverage on the ANC. Other youth divisions re-
ceived less than 5% of total coverage on their respective political parties.
Figure 7
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The ANC Youth League’s political affairs received most pertinence. Much 
less interest pertained to the youth wing’s policies regarding issues per-
taining to issues of interest to the youth. The ANC Youth League’s policy 
regarding the nationalisation of mines was the only policy receiving ex-
tensive media discussion. As such, it could be argued that political de-
bates regarding issues of importance to the youth are neglected.
25 Julius Malema had been president of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) until he was 
expelled from the ANC after being found guilty of sowing divisions within the party. This 
was a controversial decision as he was strongly supported by certain factions of the ANC 
as well as being popular amongst the ANCYL.
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Not only did the youth divisions of political parties receive mostly nega-
tive media attention, but there was also a lack of media confidence in 
young up-and-coming political leaders. Julius Malema dominated cover-
age on young leaders. 
Figure 8                                                                            Figure 9
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Media use
Most respondents said they used radio news most for getting informa-
tion (70.8%), with SA TV news (67.3%) as the second highest source of 
information. Google or other search engines was the third most stated 
source of news media (62.8%). The medium used the least by survey 
respondents to gather news were tabloid newspapers (38.5%). 
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Unemployed youth use tabloid newspapers significantly more than oth-
ers in the employment category (58.8%), but are at the same time the 
highest users of SA TV news (82.5%). There is equally high use amongst 
unemployed youth of radio news as a source of news (82.5%). Of the 
media surveyed, employed youth use SA TV news most to obtain news 
(71.9%). Employed youth also use mainstream newspapers significant-
ly more than other occupation categories (61.7%)26. Employed youth 
use tabloid newspapers least to obtain news (36.1%). Radio news is 
the most significant source of news for youth attending school (73.4%) 
with Google or other search engines the second most preferred source 
(68.9%). The most preferred way for young people in college of uni-
versity to access the news is through Google or other search engines 
(68.4%). Six out of 10 young people (61.3%) in this category said they 
use social media as a news source – the highest amongst all the occupa-
tion categories27. 
26 Mainstream newspaper use: In school = 46.8%, in college/university = 53.3%, and 
unemployed = 54.4%.
27 Google or other search engines as a news source: In school = 52.9%, employed = 
50.5%, and unemployed = 39.5%.
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The data show strong disparities for the use of Google and other search 
engines as a source of information for news amongst South African 
youth. Although unemployed youth show the lowest usage of Google or 
other search engines (40.4%), this figure is still much higher than gen-
eral internet usage figures across South Africa. There is disagreement 
about the number of internet users in South Africa. Some statistics show 
figures of 20% (World Wide Worx) while another more recent study 
showing evidence of up to one in three people in South Africa, or 12.3 
million people, accessing the internet (De Lanerolle 2012: 6).
More interestingly is the comparatively low number of respondents who 
said they use either local online news websites (40.5%) or international 
news websites (39.2%) to obtain news information. This is significantly 
lower than the figures for Google and other search engines across all 
respondents (62.8%), but still significantly higher than the average for 
internet use across South Africa. This may point to the fact that young 
people are using the internet to find specific information, using search 
engines to find relevant information rather than relying on generic local 
or international news websites.
Youth with tertiary education also use Google or other search engines as 
their most preferred source for news most often (71.8%) and significant-
ly more than respondents with lower education levels. (No/little school-
ing, 53.1%, Grade 12, 65.5%.) Seven out of 10 (71.9%) respondents with 
little or no education use radio news as a source of news most. SA TV 
news is also a predominant source of news (70.6%) in this category. Re-
spondents with Grade 12 education also use radio news most to access 
news (74%), with Google and other search engines as the second most 
used medium for news access (65.5%)
Younger survey respondents (15-20 years) use radio news most to ac-
cess news (70%) and Google or other search engines almost as much 
(68.8%). Google and other search engines saw significant disparities 
amongst different age categories. Older respondents (31 years and old-
er) use this technology the least of those surveyed (49.2%). While 60.3% 
of 21 – 30 year olds also use Google and other search engines for news 
access, this medium was the third most used within this age group after 
radio news (72.3%) and TV news (71.8%).
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Black African respondents use both radio news and TV news equally as 
sources of information of the media surveyed (74.1%). SA TV news is 
used significantly less amongst White youth (46.3%), who use Google 
and other search engines most to access their news (78.2%). Indian/Co-
loured youth also use radio news the most to access news (68.2%). Tab-
loid newspapers are the least preferred news source (38.1%) among this 
group. Significantly, more Black African youth use tabloids as a news 
source (45.8%) than White youth (11.6%). 
Youth with high income levels28 use Google and other search engines 
the most to access news (80.8%) and use tabloid newspapers the least 
(20.2%). Radio news is the most accessed media for those in the lowest 
income category (80%), while least used amongst this group is interna-
tional online news websites (28%). The second lowest income group use 
SA TV news as their predominant source of news (82%). This category 
is the highest users of this medium amongst all income categories while 
the highest income group use SA TV the least (56.7%). Radio news is 
used most by the third lowest income group as their most significant 
news source (71.4%), while radio news show significantly lower figures 
as a preferred source for the higher income groups (60-61%). The sec-
ond highest income group uses Google and other search engines, and 
local online news sites as the two highest sources for news (both 69.2%).
Respondents from rural areas (79.1%), small towns (68.9%) and cities 
(68.1%) all use radio news as the most preferred source of information. 
Respondents from rural areas use international online news websites the 
least (31.6%). Respondents from rural areas (53.9%) use tabloid newspa-
pers as a news source significantly more than those in large cities (31.7%). 
Tabloid newspapers are the least preferred medium of information for 
urban respondents as well as respondents in small towns (38.1%). Almost 
eight out of ten respondents in rural areas (76.7%) prefer SA TV news as 
a source of information while 63.1% of urban respondents and 67.1 of 
respondents in small towns prefer the same medium. Local online news 
websites, social media, and Google or other search engines show no sig-
nificant difference in usage by respondents from different areas.
28  Income was divided into the following categories – less than R1500, between R1501 
– R3300, between R3301 – R9000, between R9001 – R21 000, and more than R21 001.
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Significant differences are evident between respondents who attend dif-
ferent types of schools with respondents attending township schools 
using predominantly SA TV news (75.1%), and radio news (74.6%) as 
sources for news. These respondents also use tabloid newspapers sig-
nificantly more (47.1%) than respondents who attend ex-Model C or 
private schools (28%). Respondents from township schools also use lo-
cal community newspapers significantly more (51.9%) than those who 
attend or private schools (34.5%). Only 58.2% of respondents from ex-
Model C or private schools use SA TV news as a news source. This is 
not only significantly lower than respondents from township schools, 
but also significantly lower than the overall percentage. Of the media 
surveyed, respondents from ex-Model C or private schools use predomi-
nantly Google and other search engines (71.6%) and radio news (66.1%) 
to obtain news.
Figure 11
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It seems that young people have an interest in using online resources 
(particularly search engines) to find news information but they may be 
prohibited by cost, access and education. Young people who are better 
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educated, employed or in an educational institution are more likely to 
use online resources for gathering news. There is no significant differ-
ence in the use of Google or other search engines as a news source 
amongst respondents who live in different areas (Pearson Chi-Square 
– 0.107).
Media usage amongst South African youth is surprisingly comparable 
with the young people in the Netherlands who also still favour tradi-
tional broadcasting media rather than printed newspapers. South Afri-
can youth favour radio more than television as opposed to Dutch youth 
who favour television over radio as their most important news source. 
Young people in the Netherlands also use online news proportionately 
more as sources of news than printed newspapers. While South African 
youth use online resources to access news, Dutch youth use search en-
gines rather than news websites to gather news. If one regards these 
results in relation to theory discussed in the literature review, this may 
suggest young people from the North and from South Africa may be 
well placed to access information about political and civic activity from 
online sources. At the same time, political and civic organisations would 
be well placed to use online tools to engage with young people. The 
fact that South African youth who were surveyed use search engines to 
gather news at such a significantly high level may suggest however that 
in order to use the internet as a tool to engage young people, civic and 
political organisations would need to target the material carefully at this 
audience in order to attract their attention. It also suggests that these 
young South Africans would need to be interested in a topic in order to 
use the internet (whether on a PC or their mobile phone) to search for 
information and news about this issue.
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It seems from both the survey and focus group results that young peo-
ple do have some interest in consuming news. When asked which three 
media genre they enjoy the most, the survey respondents mostly an-
swered soap opera’s (47.1%), which may indicate why TV consumption 
is so high for young people. News is the second most enjoyable genre 
(40.9%), with situation comedies as the third most enjoyable (39.6%). 
When asked which genre of media they prefer, focus group respon-
dents echoed these findings by noting comedy, soap opera’s, news on Al 
Jazeera, documentaries and sport. The fact that news scores relatively 
highly amongst the youth may have to do with the ‘politics of the re-
mote’ as a number of focus group respondents noted that they watch 
particular programmes because those with the power over the remote 
were watching them. One participant notes:
 
“For me, it’s not [that] I don’t enjoy news but it’s about the 
politics of the remote control in residential communal prop-
erties. I don’t look forward to watching news but just watch 
it as and when I have time.”
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Another notes: 
“At 7pm you know it’s time for the news at home so we just 
stay and watch with our parents.” 
As one might expect, interest in news increases with age amongst both 
South African and Dutch youth. South African school attendees are 
significantly less interested in national news (63.5%) as a media topic 
than unemployed youth (71.1%), students (73.6%) and employed youth 
(77.3%). 
Figure 13
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Perhaps more revealing in terms of what young people use media for, 
are the results regarding their interest in specific topics. Survey respon-
dents were asked to rate a number of specific media topics according to 
those they are most interested in. The results reveal not only their inter-
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est in popular culture (which was the highest at 86.3%), but also their 
significant lack of interest in politics or topics that relate to politics. Of 
the two lowest topics of interest, both related to politics, with political 
actions the least interesting (34.6%), and politics/government the sec-
ond lowest (37.9%). 
There are significant differences in politics as a media topic of interest 
amongst different races with lowest interest from the Indian/Coloured 
respondents (23.3%) and highest amongst Black African respondents 
(44.5%) (White respondents = 30.6%). The media topic that was of 
most interest to the Indian/Coloured respondents was popular culture 
– which showed similar levels across all races and no significant differ-
ences amongst the respondents. Black African respondents show strong 
levels of interest in education (86.9%), while significantly fewer Indian/
Coloured respondents showed an interest in this topic (74.4%) and even 
fewer White respondents showed an interest in this topic (68%). White 
respondents showed strong interest in comedy/humour (87.8%), popu-
lar culture (86.4%) and health (83.7%). Health was also of strong interest 
to the other respondents and showed no significant difference amongst 
different races (Black African = 79.6% and Indian/Coloured = 80.3%). 
Very few of the topics of interest surveyed show any significant differ-
ence amongst the income categories across survey respondents. ‘Break-
ing news’ was of least interest to respondents earning lower incomes. 
Comedy/humour show an increased interest as income increased (high-
est earners, 88.5% and lowest earners, 64.7%). Careers/job hunting is of 
most interest to those who earn the least (80%) and of least interest to 
those who earn the most (60.6%). Interest in education as a media topic 
increases significantly as income decreases, and social justice is of most 
interest for the highest income earners (73.1%). Only 48.2% of middle 
income earners think social justice is an interesting media topic29.
As with income, differences in age show few significant distinctions in 
which media topic is of most interest to respondents of different ages. 
Older respondents (45.9%) think politics/government is of most in-
terest while younger respondents think the same topic is of the least 
29 Less than R1500 = 63.3%, R1501 – R3300 = 60%, R9001 – R21000 = 63.1%
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interest (31.6%). National news is of most interest to the middle age 
group (77.1%) but least interesting to the younger respondents (65.4%), 
and comedy/humour is more interesting to the youngest respondents 
(83.1%) than to the oldest respondents (69.7%). All of the respondents 
find political actions to be the media topic of least interest to them, while 
both the two younger age categories find popular culture to be the most 
interesting. The oldest respondents go against this trend as they find 
education to be the media topic of most interest to them (86.1%).
Popular culture is the media topic of greatest interest to those with 
no/some schooling (88.4%), as well as those with Grade 12 (87.5%). 
Health is the topic of most interest to respondents with high education 
levels (83.8%). More than seven out of 10 (73%) of respondents with 
higher education are interested in international news, significantly more 
than those with Grade 12 (63.9%) and those with little or no schooling 
(60.3%). Interest in sport is higher amongst those with less education 
(79.7%) than those with Grade 12 (70.6%) or those with higher educa-
tion (69.3%). 
Interest in popular culture is high across all the respondents. Respon-
dents who are employed show marginally more interest in education 
(83.7%) than popular culture (83.4%). The only media topic that shows 
significant difference across this category is national news, which is of 
most interest to those working (77.3%) and of least interest to learn-
ers (63.5%). This seems to be linked to the age of the respondents as 
younger respondents show less interest in national news (65.4%) than 
the older respondents (21-30years = 77.1%, and those over 31 = 73.8%).
Respondents who live in large cities are least interested in politics 
(32.8%) but not significantly less than respondents from small towns 
(38.1%) and from rural areas (49.5%). Popular culture was the topic of 
most interest to both those living in large cities (86.9%) as well as those 
in rural areas (89.9%), while education was of most interest to those liv-
ing in small towns (86%). 
Very few of the media topics surveyed show significant differences 
across school categories. Respondents from township schools show 
the most interest in education (85.2%) and popular culture (84.4%) as 
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media topics. The interest in education as a media topic was signifi-
cantly higher than those in ex-Model C or private schools (76.4%) and 
may have been strongly influenced by the difficulties that township and 
poorer schools have in accessing educational resources such as text-
books, infrastructure and teachers. While popular culture is the topic 
of greatest interest to respondents from ex-Model C or private schools 
(88.6%), these respondents also show high levels of interest in comedy/
humour (84.3%) and topics of human interest (79.1%).
Interestingly, two of the most highly regarded topics – education (81.3%) 
and health (80.3%) – were also two of the topics most associated with 
youth in media reporting between January 2011 and September 2012. 
The content analysis show education, crime and health were the three 
topics most associated with the youth in media reporting with education 
outweighing all the other topics. This may indicate a link between me-
dia coverage and topical interest by readers. As with the survey results, 
politics as a topic scored very low in terms of media coverage associated 
with the youth. Again, one may see a greater interest in politics and po-
litical activity amongst the youth if the media associated such activities 
with young people in a positive way in their coverage of youth in South 
Africa.
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The kinds of media topics that South African youth are interested in are 
strongly matched by those in the Dutch study. As with South African 
youth, popular culture is of most interest to youth in the Netherlands, 
while political actions is the topic of least interest. But the data also 
show significant differences between the two cultures. Religion, for ex-
ample, is one media topic of relatively high interest to South African 
youth, but scores much lower in relation to other topics amongst the 
young people in the Netherlands. While breaking news is one of the top-
ics of moderate interest to young South Africans, it is one of the topics 
of most interest to youth in the Dutch study. Figure 15 shows relative 
levels of importance/interest across the two countries.
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Media and institutional trust
Respondents were asked about their trust in local, provincial and na-
tional government. The results show significantly low levels of trust in 
all three with trust in local government showing the lowest level. Only 
34.4% respondents say they trust local government a great deal or quite 
a lot. Close to four out of ten (38.3%) respondents say they trust provin-
cial government quite a lot or a great deal and 40.9% of respondents say 
they trust national government a great deal or quite a lot. There is no 
significant change in levels of trust across the different age categories 
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of survey respondents. There are however significant differences across 
other categories, as illustrated in Figure 16.
Figure 16
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Levels of trust in provincial government follow the same patterns as 
those in local government, with Black African respondents reporting the 
highest levels of trust amongst the race categories (Black African, 44.3%, 
Indians/Coloureds, 29.4%, and Whites, 31%). Respondents with the low-
est levels of schooling reported the highest levels of trust amongst the 
education category (no/some schooling, 42.6%; Grade 12,39.6%, and 
tertiary educated, 31.8%), and respondents who are employed have low-
er levels of trust than those where are unemployed (employed, 33.5%; 
unemployed, 48.1%). Respondents with less monthly income are sig-
nificantly more trusting of local government than those with higher in-
comes. Almost six out of ten respondents (57.4%) say they trust local 
government while only two out of ten respondents (19.8%) in the high-
est earning category have trust in local government. Of the respondents 
living in in rural areas 44.6% say they trust local government – signifi-
cantly more than respondents from large cities (27.9%) and small towns 
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(38%). Respondents from township schools also trust local government 
significantly more (35.4%) than those who attend ex-Model C or private 
schools (33%). The same kind of pattern emerges when one examines 
levels of trust in national government. Trust in the national government 
is highest amongst Black African respondents, respondents with low lev-
els of schooling, the unemployed, lowest earners, respondents who live 
in rural areas and who respondents who attend township schools.
Figure 17
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Race is a significant variable in levels of trust amongst South African 
youth. Indian/Coloured youth show very low levels of trust across all 
institutions. White youth are also less trustful of public institutions than 
Black African youth. White youth are most trustful of private compa-
nies. Black African (77%) and Indian/Coloureds respondents have high 
levels of trust in religious institutions (73.3%) and White youth have low 
levels (53.4%) of trust in religious institutions. 
It seems that young people in South Africa are generally uninterested 
and mistrustful of political institutions and political parties. This in-
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cludes low levels of trust in the legal system, the police, and in parlia-
ment. Only 30.7% of respondents say they trust political parties either a 
great deal or quite a lot. Young people who earn more are less trustful of 
public institutions, including the police, while those with lower incomes 
are more trusting of the older generation. Unemployed youth are more 
trusting of public institutions. This could be because they rely on public 
or state assistance such as child support grants and other social grants. 
Young people who live in rural areas are also more trusting of public 
institutions than those who live in large cities. Interestingly, those who 
live in rural areas show less trust in the older generation (75.1%) than 
those who live in large cities (77.8%), while those who live in small towns 
show the highest levels of trust in the older generation (80.5%). This 
trend is reversed when one examines trust in religious institutions with 
respondents in rural areas showing higher levels of trust (75.3%) than 
those in large cities (69.8%), and respondents in small towns (78.3%) 
showing the highest levels of trust in religious institutions.
Young people with lower levels of education show higher levels of trust 
across public institutions than those with higher levels of education. 
Attitudes towards religious institutions show high levels of trust across 
the education category. This pattern is the same for levels of trust in 
the older generation across the education category. Respondents from 
township schools show higher levels of trust in most political processes 
including local party elections (34.9%) and political parties (32.9%) as 
compared to respondents from ex-Model C or private schools (33.5% 
and 25.7% respectively). Respondents from all types of schools show 
the highest levels of trust in the older generation, with those from town-
ship schools showing significantly higher levels of trust (80.4%) than 
those from ex-Model C or private schools (77.1%). Higher income earn-
ers show lower levels of trust in public institutions, the police and parlia-
ment, but higher levels of trust in public companies than lower income 
earners. Respondents with low income show significantly high levels of 
trust in the older generation when compared with higher earners.
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Institutional trust 
These findings correspond with the responses from participants of the 
focus group discussions who reported that their experiences with politi-
cians are generally negative because politicians tend to make promises 
that are never kept. One respondent, when asked about meetings with 
politicians, said: 
“They don’t always keep their promises. Those are some of 
the things we have experienced in the meetings.” 
Another argued that meeting with a politician was a negative experience 
because of the ‘political propaganda”.
These remarks relate to experiences around voting at municipal (local) 
and national level and many focus group participants reported negative 
experiences around voting. This will be discussed in more detail later in 
the report.
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The high level of trust among respondents in religious institutions 
(73.3%) and the older generation (77.4%) is significant. While respon-
dents show trust in religious institutions respondents did not show 
significant interest in consuming religious content through the media 
either in the survey data or the focus group discussions. So while Indi-
an/Coloured South African youth distrust the government and political 
institutions they do turn to their religious institutions and leaders as a 
source of trust. White youth on the other hand show little trust in politi-
cal institutions or religious institutions. 
Most young South Africans note the older generation as an institution 
they trust most (77.4%). Although there are some differences amongst 
race groups (Indians/Coloureds, 84%; Black Africans, 76.5%; Whites, 
75.4%) these are relatively high in comparison with trust shown in other 
institutions. It is possible that trust in the older generation stems for a 
culture of trust and respect amongst all race groups for their elders. It 
is also likely that as trust in other institutions weakens, youth are turn-
ing to the older generation as a point of stability and a source of assur-
ance. The literature review in this report points to a more theoretical 
understanding of the importance of relationships between young people 
and their parents in the formation of civic identity and shaping political 
participation.
Compared to levels of trust in political institutions, levels of trust in 
the media are significantly high amongst South African youth: TV news 
(79.5%), radio news (78.3%) and newspapers (71.9%). Almost six out of 
ten respondents say they trust magazines and social media (59.2% and 
57.7% respectively).  
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Media trust 
It is interesting that respondents regard newspapers as more trustwor-
thy than social media. Usage statistics in this survey show that young 
people use newspapers much less than social media. (Although they do 
not use social media for news gathering purposes.) Also interesting is 
the fact that young people said they use radio news to gather news in-
formation more than TV news and yet trust TV news more than radio 
news. This is perhaps linked to access to television, as well as some of 
the findings from the focus group discussions, which indicate a prefer-
ence for television because it allows them to see what was being dis-
cussed in the news broadcast. This finding also correlates with findings 
from studies in the North which provide evidence that showing imagery 
of what happens counts as proof for young people that the reporting is 
reliable (Costera Meijer, 2006). In the South African focus group discus-
sions this was noted by a number of participants. One participant noted: 
“I would say that I trust TV the most because they always 
show what happened live. They don’t just say that something 
happened. There is something, a picture that shows you that 
something did happen so that you trust it and it’s live.”
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 Another participant added:
 
“I like TV because you can see that thing when it is happen-
ing and you can see that it happened, but in the newspaper 
you cannot see it happen, it is written.”
 
Finally, a third participant reiterated these feelings by stating:
 
“TV is real because the cameras were there, so it’s something 
real and newspaper people were not there.”
Focus group respondents acknowledge that the media may sometimes 
be biased and that reporting is influenced by profits and politics: 
“The media chase money so they thrive on controversial top-
ics to sell papers”
“It’s like the media can be controlled by political powers … 
if they can control it, then that means they [politicians] have 
something to hide.”
One respondent notes that trust in the media “depends on your educa-
tion or media literacy to be able to dissect facts from opinion. The ordi-
nary people believe the news as nothing but facts”. 
The survey findings support this. Respondents with less schooling and 
who are unemployed are more trusting of the traditional media (broad-
casting and print). Significantly more respondents who are unemployed 
trust TV news (91%) compared to respondents who are employed (74%). 
This trend continues with trust in radio news. Unemployed respondents 
trust this medium more (89.1%) than those who are employed (74.1%). 
Social media is trusted almost equally by both unemployed respondents 
(63.7%) and employed respondents (60.75). 
Race also seems to be a significant indicator in levels of trust in different 
types of media. Black African youth show higher levels of trust in tele-
vision news (83%) than both White (78%) and Indian/Coloured youth 
(74%). Black African youth show lower levels of trust than White youth 
in all other media. 
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Figure 20
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Respondents across different age categories show no significant differ-
ence in levels of trust in media. The only significant difference is a relation 
between education and trust in television as a source of news. Respon-
dents with little or no schooling show high levels of trust (85.1%) when 
compared with respondents who had Grade 12 (79.1%) or a college/
university education (73.5%). Respondents with lower levels of income 
show significantly higher levels of trust across all media than those with 
higher incomes, and those who live in rural areas show significantly 
higher levels of trust across all media than respondents in large cities. 
Respondents from township schools show significantly more trust in 
media than those from ex-Model C or private schools. Trust across this 
category was highest for both types of schools in television news (town-
ship, 81.4% and ex-Model C or private schools, 77.6%). 
Trust in media could be related to how well respondents think the media 
are reporting on news in South Africa. Media that scored highly in the 
survey when respondents were asked whether they felt the media were 
doing a good or bad job in reporting the media correspond with levels 
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of trust. SA TV news is regarded as doing a good job (81%) but only 
marginally better than radio news (79.9%). Mainstream newspapers 
also score highly overall (70.2%). Surprisingly, international TV (DSTV), 
score the highest level of trust (84.1%). This may be related to feelings 
expressed by focus group respondents about the bias of both profits and 
politics in the South African media.
Respondents in the survey and focus group participants show little trust 
in the tabloid press. When asked in the focus group discussions which 
media they trusted, participants not only noted ones that they did trust, 
but also specifically pointed to the tabloid press as publications which 
cannot be trusted: “It’s best staying away from the tabloids.” When 
asked specifically if they trusted tabloid newspapers, most focus group 
participants were disparaging of tabloid newspapers and said they read 
them only because they were ‘fun’ or because they were ‘bored’ and 
needed entertainment. Other phrases used to describe the tabloids in-
clude ‘sensational’, ‘senseless’, ‘untrue’, and one participant noted that 
they ‘stretch things to a point that it is not true anymore’. 
This mistrust in tabloids is further reflected in the survey results which 
show that respondents (40.7%) feel the tabloids are doing a good job of 
reporting news almost half as much as SA TV news. When asked if they 
felt that tabloid newspapers were credible or trustworthy, only 19.2% of 
respondents agreed.
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Civic identity and the media
One of the aims of the research project was to determine whether young 
South Africans use the media to establish their civic identity and wheth-
er the media form part of the resources they draw on to establish their 
identity as South African citizens. It is often taken for granted that the 
media are central to identity formation (Marshall 1964, Murdock 1992). 
This assumption needs to be explored further to better understand how 
young people create a sense of themselves, and particularly how they 
establish their civic identity and their sense of social responsibility in 
the South African context. 
In order to evaluate this quantitatively, respondents were asked which 
entertainment and lifestyle media they felt provided the most relevant 
information to them as young South Africans. Interestingly the top three 
media most relevant to respondents were radio (37.7%), social media 
(34.1%), and Google or other search engines (33.8%). This is significant-
ly different (except for radio) to usage figures for the media that show 
TV, radio, and SMS as the three top media regularly used by young peo-
ple. This may indicate that while young South Africans use certain me-
dia regularly, they find the information they receive on those platforms 
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as less than relevant to their lives. This is particularly surprising con-
sidering that soap operas and situation comedies are the genres most 
favoured by young people – genres they are consuming although they 
don’t consider them to be relevant to their lives. This finding may be re-
lated to the potential of social media platforms that allow young people 
to search for, select, regulate and generate entertainment and lifestyle 
information that is relevant to their lives. This corresponds to research 
done by Buckingham (1997), which shows that young people are drawn 
to Web 2.0 technology because of its participatory nature.
When asked which media they felt provided the most relevant news and 
information the results were quite different (again except for radio) with 
the top three being radio (44%), SA TV news (42.9%), and mainstream 
newspapers (39.1%). Trends across age groups show that the older re-
spondents become, the more relevant these three media are to them. 
Mainstream newspapers’ relevance to 15-20 year olds is 30.9%, but for 
21-30 year olds it is 44.9% and for 31+ year olds it is 49.2%.
Figure 22
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The findings further show that young White South Africans find the 
news and information from the media more relevant than other race 
groups. (Except for tabloids that show low levels of relevance across all 
race categories.) This may reflect a tendency in the South African news 
media to provide content that disregards Black African and Indian/Co-
loured youth, or that White South African youth are accessing news 
media that is more relevant to their own particular lived experience. 
Figure 23
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When focus group participants were asked if they felt the news media 
was relevant and of interest to young people the results varied. The 
generally negative perceptions raised by focus group participants corre-
spond with the survey results as illustrated above. A number of partici-
pants mentioned Julius Malema specifically in response to this question, 
saying the news media pay too much attention to Malema. One respon-
dent said: “Politicians – Zuma and Malema must stop it now. Please we 
want our own space now.” Another argued that he would “like to see less 
of Julius Malema”.
A large portion of focus group participants feel the news media they are 
exposed to are not interesting or relevant to them because it portrays 
negative stories. One participant said: “The media only tell us about the 
problems. That is what makes me apathetic.” Another said: “I’d like to 
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see more things that are uplifting on the media.” Another participant, 
referring to the miners’  strikes30, said: “They [the media] must give us 
something we can learn from and leave the strikes. We are not learning 
anything from the strikes.”
Focus group participants also said the news focus on issues which are 
outside of their particular context: 
“If it could be that the content of the news focus on our local 
areas and show things that affect people, it would be best.”
 
Another reiterated this point: “I would like the media to focus on things 
closer to home; on our issues.”
 
Another said: 
“Most of the time we hear about international news, so if you 
could go to these places like farms and see how people live. 
It would be interesting to me to see how they live.”
 
Finally, one respondent used a city in the Eastern Cape as an example of 
how the media are failing to make news relevant to young people: 
 
“Mthatha is only on the news when Nelson Mandela is 
around. News is everywhere but we hardly see those news.” 
These focus group results indicate that the media are failing to engage 
young people with information and news that is relevant to them, that 
is contextualised either by geography or in terms of youth issues. The 
survey results show that as young people begin to gain qualifications 
they will begin to look at local online media for more relevant informa-
tion (no/some schooling, 24.7%; Grade 12; 29.7%; tertiary education, 
30 On 16 August 2012,the police killed 34 miners during striking action for better wages against 
gold mining company Lonmin at the Marikana mine. The incident was significant not only be-
cause of the large number of people who were killed, but also because it evoked comparisons with 
Apartheid-era treatment of striking workers. This incident came to be known as the Marikana 
Massacre and caused widespread condemnation of the police action by both local and interna-
tional organisations.
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43.2%). As mentioned previously, when it comes to entertainment and 
lifestyle media, the youth are already moving away from traditional me-
dia as their biggest sources. This move could continue as mobile inter-
net and mobile applications for social media become more accessible 
and affordable to young people in South Africa.
When asked what would make the media more relevant to young people 
like themselves, respondents noted that one of the most important ways 
to make the media more relevant is to ensure that it helps them under-
stand the world they live in. Focus groups participants also emphasised 
a focus on their lived contexts. This points to an expectation by youth 
to relate media information to the world they live in. These findings 
are similar to those from Dutch youth, who wanted to understand their 
world better and learn more from the news than they felt they received 
(Costera Meijer, 2006).
Figure 24
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The data is significant in relation to the content analysis data. Although 
the content analysis shows education as the topic most associated with 
youth, the survey results show that respondents feel strongly that the 
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media are not helping them in their education or their career. This could 
be attributed to the fact that only a small portion of the media cover-
age on education was positive. So while the media is reporting a great 
deal on topics that young people feel are relevant to them, the nature of 
the reporting not of value to the youth. Participants in the focus group 
discussions said that although they watch soap operas, they would find 
programming focused towards their careers more beneficial: 
 
“When you get SABC, ok, mostly they broadcast soapies. Why 
not broadcast more like career guidance programmes, or 
programmes that advise you about jobs that are out there?”
Survey respondents (70.6%) felt strongly that every newspaper should 
have a youth page. This is an indication that young people are not able 
to relate to content in newspapers. Interestingly, Black African youth, 
and Indian/Coloured youth feel more strongly than White youth with 
regards to this statement (see table below). This links with data that 
show White youth find newspapers more relevant than Black African 
and Indian/Coloured youth and as a result are less inclined towards the 
need for a specific youth page.
table 1
every newspaper should have a youth page Total
Black African Indian or 
Coloured
White
No/No response 25.9% 29.1% 42.2% 29.3%
Yes 74.1% 70.9% 57.8% 70.7%
The general apathy towards news content and the notion that newspa-
pers should include a youth page was echoed in the focus group discus-
sions. Par ticipants said news content should be targeted towards young 
people rather than generic programming: 
“We want different news for different audiences. The way 
in which news is presented is not captivating for the youth. 
There needs to be a rethink about news presentation strate-
gies and formats. We need more entertaining programmes.”
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If the youth feel like they are not receiving relevant, contextual and tar-
geted information from the news media, then it is less likely that they 
will engage with the media as a source of identity formation. 
Civic engagement and the media
One part of civic identity is engagement with civic and political activity. 
In part, this research examines the levels of engagement by the youth 
in different kinds of civic, social or political activity. Survey responses 
and focus group discussions reflect low levels of political activity and 
engagement. Willingness to vote, political activity and general interest 
in politics was particularly low amongst South African youth across the 
categories, and this is perhaps one of the most striking results of the 
data. Survey respondents were asked which activities they had been in-
volved in during the last 12 months. Of the options, political activities 
were often at the lowest level of responses. The data show young South 
Africans tend to participate more in civic or social activities. Helping 
a neighbour was the most common answer from survey respondents 
(79.1%), with being involved in a social group (67.4%) and being active 
in a religious activity (64.9). 
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Respondents reported relatively low participation even in activities spe-
cifically aimed at youth involvement, such as activity in a youth move-
ment, and being part of the student council. In focus groups, engagement 
in political and civic activities (such as charitable work and signing a peti-
tion) was further examined. These discussions provide greater insight into 
some reasons for the lack of participation and engagement. Focus group 
participants were asked at different points during the discussions about 
the problems they face as youth and whether they feel they can do any-
thing about these problems. The responses reveal perceptions of a lack of 
agency with regards to being active in their communities or helping other 
people. Some of the responses indicate that the youth themselves feel 
they need to give assistance but they are not in a position to help others: 
 
“How can you say that you are going to help someone…if 
you yourself are not employed or…earning so much [little] 
that you can only help yourself.”
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Another respondent reiterates: “Basically as an individual I’m not sure 
what I can do personally as a person.”
While levels of involvement in political activities are low across all cate-
gories of respondents, young Black African South Africans show signifi-
cantly higher levels of involvement in political activities than other rac-
es. Black African respondents are significantly more involved in youth 
movements (40.8%) than both White (36.5%) and Indian/Coloured 
(36.3%) respondents. This pattern is similar with regards to trade union 
activity where Black African respondents are significantly more involved 
(13.8%) than White (7.5%) and Indian/Coloured (7.6%) respondents. One 
sees a similar proportion of involvement by Black African respondents 
in political parties (23.3%), with White respondents (8.2%), and the low-
est level of involvement in political party activity by Indian/Coloured 
respondents (5.8%). One category where Indian/Coloured respondents 
are significantly more involved is in religious activities. Indian/Coloured 
youth show the highest levels of involvement (71.3%) over Black African 
youth (67.1%), and White youth (46.3%). White youth show the highest 
levels of involvement in activities that take place online (posting views 
to an online blog/group, and visiting online forums).
Respondents with higher education levels are significantly more en-
gaged in online activities than those with no/some schooling and those 
with Grade 12. Levels of engagement in other political or youth activi-
ties show no significant difference across the different levels of educa-
tion. Young people in rural areas or small towns are generally more 
involved in youth and political activities than those in large cities. Online 
activities (posting views to an online blog/group, and visiting online fo-
rums) are significantly higher in large cities than small towns and rural 
areas. Employed youth are significantly less involved in political activi-
ties such as being active in a political party or part of a trade union than 
those who are unemployed or in school or college. Students in college 
or university are significantly more involved in online activities (posting 
views to an online blog/group, and visiting online forums) than either 
learners, employed or unemployed youth.
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Compared to Dutch youth, South Africa’s youth is significantly more 
engaged, particularly in activities that are time consuming such as help-
ing a neighbour and being involved in religious activities. See Figure 26.
Figure 26
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As a key indicator of political activity, voting patterns amongst the 
youth were surveyed and probed in the focus group discussions. Three 
out of ten (27.9%) respondents did not vote in the last national elec-
tions, 42.1% did vote, and 30% said they were not old enough to vote 
at the time. While the figure for those who voted is relatively high, it is 
still lower than the figures for the last national election when 56.7% of 
eligible voters cast their ballot31. Slightly more respondents say they 
voted in the last municipal elections (40.7%), while 34.5% say they did 
not vote, and 24.8% saying they were not old enough to vote at the time. 
When asked if they intended to vote in the next elections (both national 
and municipal), the vast majority of survey respondents said they did. 
31 Data gathered from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (http://
www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=ZA)
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More than eight out of ten respondents (82%) said they intended to vote 
at the next national elections and 78.3% said they intended to vote at the 
next municipal elections. 
One of the few questions that show a disparity between the survey 
results and the focus group discussions was the question of voting. A 
strongly negative perception of voting emerge from the focus group dis-
cussions, particularly amongst unemployed participants who say that 
they do not vote because they feel let down by having done so in the 
past. Some of the responses from participants include: 
“No it’s useless. I’m not going to vote anytime soon.”
“I have never voted too. I don’t see the use of voting.” 
Personally I’ve lost trust in politicians, and the last time I 
voted was 2006.” 
“Never voted, because the thing is I feel that the party that’s 
in power right now, even if it loses its nantsika… its rule, 
another party’s going to do the same thing that they are… 
the one in power is doing, so I don’t really participate in 
politics.”
 
“I’ve never voted. And I will never vote, because the govern-
ment is going to do what they want anyway.”
These kinds of responses relate to results discussed previously in this 
report with regard to institutional trust and the lack of trust in political 
institutions.
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One of the reasons offered by participants in focus group discussions 
for not voting is that their vote will not improve government services 
(such as health, education, roads, transport, etc). This perception emerg-
es from almost all the focus groups. One respondent argues: “
It’s all the same, if you vote or not because nothing improves. 
Your vote does nothing.”
Another says: 
“We have been voting for a long time and there is nothing 
going on. It is like as it was before.”
 
One respondent notes: 
“I was saying that the vote will make a change to people that 
are already living that life, not to us people living here in the 
location.”
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There was not a single positive comment with regards to the potential 
influence of voting on government services within the focus groups con-
sisting of unemployed participants.
Young people further seem to be uninterested in information and news 
about politics or political activity. When asked if news about political 
actions interest them, 34.6% of survey respondents said yes. Similarly 
when asked about interest in politics or the government as a media topic 
only 37.9% of survey respondents are interested. This could be related 
to responses to questions about the necessity of the media for citizens to 
be engaged in society. Almost five out of ten respondents (47.3%) agree 
with the statement the media (especially news media) are not necessary 
for citizens to be engaged in South Africa. One can relate these findings 
to the discussion in the literature review on the complexity between 
media consumption, information gathering and civic engagement. Re-
searchers do not agree on how this relationship influences young peo-
ple, and the results of the study also seem to show some challenges to 
traditional views regarding consumption and action.
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ConCLUsIon AnD ReCoMMenDAtIons
The extensive amount of data collected through the surveys, focus groups 
and content analysis have resulted in interesting and sometimes surpris-
ing results with which to examine the relationship between the youth, 
civic identity, civic engagement and the media. As discussed in the litera-
ture review, the relationship between media consumption (particularly 
traditional news media) and civic engagement has often been taken for 
granted. The aim of the study is to examine this relationship more closely 
within the South African context and to probe further the nuanced rela-
tionship between the media and young people in relation to the public 
sphere and their place within it. The findings illustrate that although there 
are strong correlations across the different variables chosen for the sur-
vey results (age, location, occupation, income, race, school, education), 
some disparities are emerging. One example of such a disparity is rela-
tively high levels of voting amongst many youth respondents reported in 
the survey, but low levels of trust in public and political institutions. 
What is most evident from the data is the mistrust of politics and politi-
cal processes amongst the South African youth. The findings also gen-
erally show that youth are uninterested in politics as a topic for media 
consumption. This disinterest has implications for the identity of young 
South Africans who are disengaged from political activity (although vot-
ing patterns seem relatively high). The findings suggest that if the South 
African government and other political institutions want to engage with 
the youth they would need to consider inserting political information in 
the kinds of media that young people are interested in, and media they 
enjoy using the most. The National Youth Policy is one key strategy for 
engaging youth in civic and political life if it were able to harness trends 
of media access and media use among young people. The youth policy 
acknowledges for example that young people have the right to ‘access 
information which is age appropriate’ (2009: 19), but does not provide 
information on how this can be achieved and how to go beyond age ap-
propriateness to context appropriateness. A key finding in this study is 
that young people feel the media are not relevant to them. Generating 
relevant media that engage young people could be set as a key objective 
by agencies such as the National Youth Development Agency and the 
Media Development and Diversity Agency.
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While young people use traditional and some new media for gathering 
news and information, there is a strong sense from the results that the 
youth do not feel that the media are relevant to them. In order to make 
politics and civic engagement more integral to the identity of young 
people the media need to be made relevant to the youth in the genres 
that they enjoy most (soap operas and situation comedies). Baum (2003) 
argues that one way of attracting viewers (in this case young viewers) to 
certain topics (such as policy or politics) is to use ‘soft news’. Soft news 
is defined as information that is entertaining and personally useful to 
the recipient, as opposed to hard news which is argued to be news of a 
breaking event which involved major issues or ‘disruptions in the rou-
tines o daily life’ (Baum & Jamison, 2011:122). Participatory media may 
also be a strategy for engaging with young people and producing media 
that is relevant to their lives. Community radio stations in South Africa 
have been using participatory methods in engaging young people in the 
content production for some time. This could be expanded as a possible 
avenue for engaging young people on civic and political issues32. 
The findings show that it would be in the interest of the media and es-
pecially the news media, to target more content towards young South 
Africans. This is particularly true of Black African and Indian/Coloured 
youth who feel strongly about the need for youth content in newspapers. 
The content analysis shows that ‘the media’s tone of reporting on the 
youth became increasingly negative during 2012 and coverage was most-
ly problem-focused’. Comments from focus group participants show that 
this is regarded as a shortcoming in attracting youth to the media. The 
findings further show a need for more contextualised coverage of young 
people. This could make young people feel that they are being addressed 
in a positive way and it could help young people understand their world 
better. The National Youth Policy identifies six ‘priority target groups’ 
(2009: 1) among the youth: young women, youth with disabilities, unem-
ployed youth, school-aged out-of-school youth, youth in rural areas, and 
youth at risk. Interaction with these groups can be used to guide policy 
makers, civil organisations, public institutions and the media to target 
young people in a more nuanced way than is currently the case. 
32 A shortcoming of the survey questionnaire was not to consider community radio as a source of 
news, information, entertainment or communication. 
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The results of this study illustrate that young people across South Africa 
need support in developing a civic identity. NGOs, the National Youth 
Development Agency, government departments, and private companies 
could provide such support. The older generation has emerged as a key 
support system for young people in this study. This can be used to great 
advantage by educators and other facilitators in thinking creatively 
about ways to engage young people (across all key categories) in civic 
and political life. 
Young people with access to the Internet (whether through their mobile 
phones or laptop/PC) are using this resource to find information that 
is relevant to them. This is an avenue for further engagement with the 
youth if levels of access, literacy, affordability and usage are increased. 
This is particularly true for Black African youth, unemployed youth and 
youth with little or no schooling. Access to Internet resources will allow 
young people to control the content they receive, find information and 
news that is relevant to their context and perhaps even generate con-
tent of their own that can be shared by other youth. Young people make 
up a large majority of the South African population, and while voting 
figures are relatively high in these survey results, the lack of trust and 
engagement with political activity by young people should be worrying 
for government and civil society. The use of new media and mobile me-
dia such as SMS can be a powerful tool for engaging and empowering 
young people to be active citizens.
Media literacy is another issue emerging as a possible key to encourage 
political and civic engagement. The word ‘media’ does not occur in the 
National Youth Policy document. The closest is the occasional reference 
to ICTs. For example, increasing young people’s access to ICTs is seen 
as one of the ways in which opportunities for young people can be en-
hanced through involvement in political and civic activities (2009:31). 
The policy document mentions ICT peer education as among the youth’s 
responsibilities and proposes that young people should “engage in peer 
to peer education to promote youth development in areas such as litera-
cy, use of information and communication technology, healthy lifestyles 
to prevent no communicable [sic] diseases like HIV and AIDS and others, 
violence prevention and peace building” (2009: 20). 
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The use of search engines, and other online media do play a role in news 
awareness amongst some South African youth. It is also evident that 
because of the lack of relevance in traditional media, those who can are 
using online sources to gather information and news that is relevant to 
them. The government, educational institutions and NGOs could pro-
mote online media as a resource for young people to gain news and 
information that could build their civic identity. More young South Af-
ricans should have more access to not only the technology, but also the 
skills and education required to use media technologies as a resource to 
learn more about themselves and the world they live in.
It is evident from the content analysis that the media’s tone of reporting 
on the youth became increasingly negative during 2012 and coverage 
was mostly problem-focused. The ramifications of Apartheid on the de-
velopment of the youth are evident in media coverage. The press fo-
cused increasingly on unemployment, inequality as well as the situation 
of the poor. Growing debate regarding the social situation of the youth 
resulted in greater scrutiny of access to, and the quality of, education. 
There is an increasing perception that education is in crisis. The stam-
pede at the University of Johannesburg, the Eastern Cape education cri-
sis as well as the Limpopo books scandal contributed towards growing 
concern of an education crisis. The Youth Wage Subsidy received much 
debate during 2012. The media reported that the ANC-led government 
had backpedalled on the Youth Wage Subsidy so as to win back Cosatu’s 
favour. Cosatu strongly opposed the Youth Wage Subsidy and was in 
favour of a job seekers grant. The outcome of the debate has not yet 
been fully determined.  
The high levels of trust of the media in general, particularly amongst 
Black African and unemployed youth, may point to the need for better 
media literacy and better understanding of the manner in which the me-
dia as an institution operates within broader society. Young people are 
also perhaps not literate in the manner in which the media can be used 
to inform their civic actions (Firestone 2010). The failure of the media 
to be a resource for young people’s evolving civic and political identity 
and the lack of mention of media in national, and local policy docu-
ments which are targeted at the youth, should be a key point of focus for 
those who work with young people. It is evident that young people use 
85
a range of media to build their civic identities, that they use the media 
to access news, and that the media is strongly trusted by most South 
African youth. The Media Development and Diversity Agency, which en-
gages with community media across the country, should be required to 
engage more with young people and encourage recipients of its funding 
to target young people.
It is evident that young people use a range of media to build their civic 
identities, that they use the media to access news, and that the media is 
strongly trusted by the youth surveyed. The Media Development and Di-
versity Agency, which engages with community media across the coun-
try, should be required to engage more with young people and encour-
age recipients of its funding to target young people.
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APPenDICes
APPenDIX one
survey Questionnaire
sAnPAD QUestIonnAIRe
A. DeMoGRAPHICs
Age:
Gender:
Female 1
Male 2
Other 3
Refused to answer 4
B. soCIAL enGAGeMent/soCIAL InteRests
3. over the last 12 months, in which of the following activities have you 
participated or been involved in? Answer yes or no.
Given money to a charity or community group 1
Volunteered for a charity or community group 2
Helped a neighbour 3
Been active in a political party 4
Been active in a youth movement 5
Been active in a trade union organisation 6
Been involved in religious activities 7
Been actively involved in a social group
(sports team, cultural organisation)
8
Been part of a student council or any kind of elected student body 9
Participated in a public demonstration 10
Signed a petition (online or other) 11
Attended a debate on a social/political issue 12
Attempted to address a social problem 13
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Written an email or a letter to a newspaper or magazine to express your 
opinion on an issue
14
Posted your views to an online group or blog (Twitter, Facebook) about a 
community or social/political issue
15
Visited online forums about issues
(e.g. discussion forums, YouTube or picture galleries)
16
None of the above 17
4. Did you vote in the most recent elections?
Yes1 no0 no, I was not old 
enough2
National election
Local government (municipal) election
Refuse to answer
   
                 
5. Do you intend to vote in the next election?
Yes1 no0
National election
Local government (municipal) election
Refuse to answer
     
6.  How much trust do you have in the following?
A great deal1 Quite a lot2 Not very 
much3
Not at all4
Local government
Provincial government
National government
Local party elections
Political parties
Public institutions (eg. Dpt 
of Home Affairs, Telkom, 
Post Office)
Private companies
Police
Legal system
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Parliament
Religious institutions
Labour unions
Older generation
Television news
Newspapers
Radio news
Social media
Magazines
7.  Which of the following media topics are of particular InteRest to you? Answer 
yes or no.
Popular culture (music, fashion/beauty, movies, television, entertainment, 
celebrity events, news, gossip; scandals)
1
Cultural/arts events and news (art, dance, drama, theatre, opera, books) 2
Sports 3
Health/ exercise/keeping fit/diet 4
Social injustices/people or causes I can help 5
Political actions/activism 6
Politics/government 7
Local news/current events 8
National news/current events 9
International news/current events 10
Breaking news 11
Business and finance 12
Technology/computers/gadgets 13
Environmental issues/climate change 14
HIV/Aids 15
Education 16
Personals/dating/relationships 17
Comedy/humour 18
Electronic games/video games/online games 19
Careers/job-hunting 20
Religion 21
Human interest 22
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8. Which of the following issues are you most concerned about? 
Very 
concerned1
Concerned2 Undecided3 Somewhat 
concerned4
Not 
concerned5
Education
Health eg HIV/
Aids
Housing
Economy eg 
unemployment, 
cost of living
Service delivery
Crime and safety 
and security eg. 
corruption, rape, 
violence against 
women
Lack of social 
amenities for 
young people
C.  MeDIA Use
9.  Which media do you use to get the information/entertainment you are 
interested in? tick all that apply
 
Mainstream newspapers (Star, Cape Times, etc) 1
Tabloid newspaper (Sun, Son etc) 2
Local community newspapers/knock and drops 3
Local online news sites 4
International online news sites (Guardian, BBC World, CNN, Al Jazeera) 5
Google and other search engines 6
Social media 7
Radio news 8
Other radio (talk shows, morning live etc) 9
South African TV news 10
South African TV entertainment (soaps, Soul City etc.) 11
International TV (DSTV) 12
Magazines 13
Other: name 14
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10.  Which media do you normally use to obtain news? tick all that apply.
Mainstream newspapers (Star, Cape Times, etc) 1
Tabloid newspaper (Sun, Son etc) 2
Local community newspapers/knock and drops 3
Local online news sites 4
International online news sites (Guardian, BBC World, CNN, Al Jazeera) 5
Google and other search engines 6
Social media 7
Radio news 8
Other radio (talk shows, morning live etc) 9
South African TV news 10
South African TV entertainment (soaps, Soul City etc.) 11
International TV (DSTV) 12
Magazines 13
Other: name 14
11.  Which media do you normally use to get information on entertainment and life-
style (eg. fashion, food, travel)? tick all that apply.
Mainstream newspapers (Star, Cape Times, etc) 1
Tabloid newspaper (Sun, Son etc) 2
Local community newspapers/knock and drops 3
Local online news sites 4
International online news sites (Guardian, BBC World, CNN, Al Jazeera) 5
Google and other search engines 6
Social media 7
Radio news 8
Other radio (talk shows, morning live etc) 9
South African TV news 10
South African TV entertainment (soaps, Soul City etc.) 11
International TV (DSTV) 12
Magazines 13
Other 14
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12.  From the list below tick the 3 that you enjoy most?
Soap operas (radio/TV) 1
News 2
Documentaries 3
Reality shows 4
Situation comedies (sitcoms) 5
Fictional stories 6
Special interest blogs 7
Internet/video games 8
Advice and self-help (magazines or online) 9
Celebrity news 10
Analysis and commentary on current events 11
Opinion columns (in either newspapers or magazines) 12
D. MeDIA AnD teCHnoLoGY
13. to what extent do you think the following media are doing a good or bad job 
regarding the reporting of news?
Very good1 Good2 Okay3 Not very 
good4
Bad5
Mainstream 
newspapers (Star, Cape 
Times, etc)
Tabloid newspapers
 (Sun, Son etc)
Local community 
newspapers/knock and 
drops
Local online news sites
International online 
news sites (Guardian, 
BBC World, CNN, Al 
Jazeera)
Radio news
Other radio (talk 
shows, morning live 
etc)
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South African TV news
International TV (DSTV)
Magazines
               
14.  to what extent do you the following media are doing a good or bad job 
regarding the reporting of entertainment and lifestyle?
Very 
good1
Good2 Okay3 Not very 
good4
Bad5
Mainstream newspapers (Star, 
Cape Times, etc)
Tabloid newspapers (Sun, Son 
etc)
Local community newspapers/
knock and drops
Local online news sites
International online news sites 
(Guardian, BBC World, CNN, Al 
Jazeera)
Radio news
Other radio (talk shows, 
morning live etc)
South African TV news
South African TV entertainment 
(soaps, Soul City etc.)
International TV (DSTV)
Magazines
15.  Which of the following do you Use regularly—at least once a week? tick all that 
apply.
Radio 1
TV 2
Paid printed newspapers 3
Free printed newspapers 4
Basic cellphone 5
Smart phone (Blackberry, iPhone, Android) 6
MXit 7
Facebook 8
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Twitter 9
SMS 9
Other social media 10
Tablet PC (iPad, Galaxy) 11
MP3 player (iPod etc) 12
Music/video downloading / sharing sites 13
Digital camera/video camera 15
Video games (games console) 16
Desktop computer with internet connection 17
Desktop computer without internet connection 18
Laptop computer with mobile/internet connection 19
Laptop computer without mobile/internet 
connection
20
Online local news sites 21
Online international news sites 22
Google and other search engines 23
Blogs/ forums 24
YouTube, Flickr and similar 25
Facebook, LinkedIn 26
Wikipedia 27
16.  on a scale of 0 to 10, how interested are you in keeping up with news and 
current events as covered on tV, radio, certain internet websites, and 
newspapers?
Scale 0 to 10 
(not at all to extremely interested)
1
17.  In an average day, how much time do you spend keeping up with news and 
current events?
None 1
15 minutes or less 2
16-30 minutes 3
31-60 minutes 4
More than 1 up to 2 hours 5
More than 2 hours 6
                   
104
18. `Where does your understanding of the following issues come from?
Education Health (eg. 
HIV/ Aids)
Housing Politics Crime, 
safety and 
security 
(eg. rape, 
violence 
against 
women, 
corruption, 
etc)
The 
economy 
(eg. 
unemploy-
ment, cost 
of living)
Mainstream 
newspapers 
(Star, Cape 
Times, etc)
Tabloid 
newspaper
 (Sun, Son etc)
Local 
community 
newspapers/
knock and drops
Local online 
news sites
International 
online news 
sites (Guardian, 
BBC World, CNN, 
Al Jazeera)
Radio news
Other radio (talk 
shows, morning 
live etc)
South African TV 
news
South African TV 
entertainment 
(soaps, Soul City 
etc.)
International TV 
(DSTV)
Magazines
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19. How good a job are the media doing in covering the following issues? 
Very good1 Good2 Not very 
good3
Bad4
Education
Health eg HIV/Aids
Housing
Economy (eg. cost of living, 
unemployment
Service delivery
Crime and safety and security 
(eg. corruption, rape and 
violence against women, 
corruption)
Issues that affect youth in 
particular
20. We are trying to understand how you view different news and information 
sources. How do you find the following media? Answer yes or no.
They are 
credible/
trust-
worthy1
They 
provide 
in-depth 
coverage2
They cover 
a range of 
issues3
They 
provide 
information 
relevant to 
me4
They are 
enjoyable to 
use5
Mainstream 
newspapers 
(Star, Cape 
Times, etc)
Tabloid 
newspaper
 (Sun, Son etc)
Local 
community 
newspapers/
knock and drops
Local online 
news sites
International 
online news 
sites (Guardian, 
BBC World, CNN, 
Al Jazeera)
Radio news
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Other radio (talk 
shows, morning 
live etc)
South African TV 
news
South African TV 
entertainment 
(soaps, Soul City 
etc.)
International TV 
(DSTV)
Magazines
Other
21.  We are trying to understand how you view of different entertainment and 
lifestyle sources. Please select all the attributes that apply to each of these 
media:
They are 
credible/ 
trustworthy1
They 
provide 
in-depth 
coverage2
They cover 
a range of 
issues3
They 
provide 
information 
relevant to 
me4
They are 
enjoyable to 
use5
Mainstream 
newspapers 
(Star, Cape 
Times, etc)
Tabloid 
newspapers
 (Sun, Son etc)
Local 
community 
newspapers/
knock and 
drops
Local online 
news sites
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International 
online news 
sites (Guardian, 
BBC World, 
CNN, Al 
Jazeera)
Google and 
other search 
engines
Social media
Radio news
Other radio 
(talk shows, 
morning live 
etc)
South African 
TV news
South 
African TV 
entertainment 
(soaps, Soul 
City etc.)
International TV 
(DSTV)
Magazines
22.  Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
Strongly 
agree1
Agree2 Disagree3 Strongly 
disagree4
If you’re well informed about current 
events/ news/social issues you get 
ahead in your school and in your 
career
If you’re well informed about current 
events/ news/social issues you are 
respected by others
I regularly discuss news/current 
events/social issues with my friends
I regularly discuss news/current 
events/social issues with my family
I discuss news/current events/social 
issues on blogs, webforums, etc
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23. What would make the media more relevant to you? Answer yes or no.
I shouldn’t have to go to much trouble to access the media 1
The media should include more coverage of people my age 2
The media should include more positive coverage of people my age 3
The media should include more coverage BY people my age 4
The articles would help me do better in my education and career 5
The media would help me better understand the world I live in 6
None of the above 7
24. Please tell us which of the following statements apply to you? 
                1
Much of the news is not relevant to me                 2
In our home we watch TV news almost on a 
daily basis
                3
Following the news is important for your 
general knowledge
                4
News is mostly dull                 5
The news media are often unnecessarily 
negative
                6
News should be less about problems and 
more about solutions
                7
News media are often biased                 8
In our home a newspaper is read almost on 
a daily basis
                9
I find newspapers something for old people                 10
News consumers are more likely to be 
engaged citizens
                11
Every newspaper should have a youth page                 12
Entertainment is more relevant to me than 
news
                13
25. Are you a south African citizen?
Yes 1
No 0
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26. If you answered no to question 4, what is your nationality?
27. Please indicate in which of the Apartheid racial categories you would 
have been placed prior to 1994*33  
Black 1
Indian 2
Coloured 3
White 4
Refused to answer 5
28. What type of school was the last one you attended?
Ex-Model C (well-resourced South African Public School) 1
Township school (under-resourced South African Public School) 2
Private 3
Other
(please specify)
4
 
  29. Which of the following best describes where you live?
Large city 1
Small town 2
Rural area 3
30.  What is the highest level of education of parent/guardian (one parent, 
whichever is highest)
None to some schooling 1
Matric/Grade 12 2
Technical college certificate (trade qualification) 3
University certificate, diploma or degree (professional qualification) 4
*33We are aware that the use of these racial categories is controversial and apologise to 
those who might take offence. However, although socially constructed, these apartheid-
era racial categories remain an important social reality for most South Africans and 
remain indicative of life chances and experiences. 
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31. What is your highest level of education?
None to some schooling 1
Matric/Grade 12 2
Technical college certificate (trade qualification) 3
University certificate, diploma or degree (professional qualification) 4
32.  Monthly household income
Less than R1500 1
Between R1501 and R3300 2
Between R3301 and R9000 3
Between R9001 and R21000 4
More than R21001 5
I don’t know 6
    
33.   Which of the following best describes your current situation?
In school 1
FET/college 2
University 3
Working part-time 4
Working full-time 5
Unemployed 6
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APPenDIX tWo
Focus group discussions moderator’s guide  
– eastern Cape and Gauteng
Let’s begin with where you live:
1. Thinking about the problems you face as young people today, which is the most 
important problem you face? 
a. Do you think there is something you can do about these problems? What?
2. Do you think the information you get from the news media is useful to give you a 
better understanding of these problems?
a. What is most useful about this information?
b. What is least useful about the information?
3. Can you recall anything you have read in the newspaper, heard on the radio, 
watched on television or read on social media that made you want to go out and 
do something about it?
a. What did you do?
b. Did you use the media to help you do this?
c. Did you ask your friends or others who live in your community to help you?
4. If you want to do something about a problem in this community / neighbourhood 
how would you find out if there are other people who would join you?
now let’s talk a bit about your experience with elections and political meetings:
5. Think of the last time you voted in an election – either local or national 
government – what or who helped you most in deciding which party to vote for?
6. Have you ever attended or participated in a meeting with politicians – nationally 
or locally?
a. Did that experience motivate you to get more involved in politics?
7. Have you ever participated in a community meeting about problems facing this 
community?
a. Did that experience motivate you to get more involved in your community?
8. Do you think that your vote will improve the quality of government services? (like 
education, or health care or roads or housing)
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now I would like to talk about ways in which you get and share information 
9. Do you think there is enough information in the news media that is of interest to 
young people?
a. What would you like to see more of? Why?
b. What would you like to see less of? Why?
10. What media that you use do you trust most? Why? 
a. Do you trust the news in tabloid newspapers like The Sun or The Daily Voice? 
Why?
And the last two questions:
11. What do you think are the responsibilities of younger citizens, like yourselves, in 
South Africa?
a. What do you think it is that newspapers or the radio or television or social 
media can do to help young people do that?
12. Could you live without newspapers, or the radio, or television or social media? 
Why?
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APPenDIX tHRee
Details of focus group discussions
Focus group 1 – Kwazulu-Natal
No of participants: 9 
Age groups: 15-17
No of males: 5
No. of females: 4
Focus group 2 – Kwazulu-Natal
No of participants: 10  
Age groups: 18 - 23
No of males: 4
No. of females: 6
Focus group 3 – Kwazulu-Natal
No of participants: 9
Age groups:  23 - 30
Focus group 4 – Eastern Cape (Grahamstown)
No of participants: 7
Age groups: 18-36
No of males:  5
No. of females: 2
Focus group 5 – Eastern Cape (Grahamstown)
No of participants: 7
Age groups: 18-36
No of males: 4
No. of females: 3
Focus group 6 – Eastern Cape (Grahamstown)
No of participants: 7
Age groups: 18-36
No of males:  5
No. of females: 2
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Focus group 7 – Eastern Cape (Alice)
No of participants: 7
Age groups:  18-36
No of males:  6
No. of females:  1
Focus group 8 – Eastern Cape (Alice)
No of participants:  7
Age groups:  18-36
No. of females:  7
Focus group 9 – Eastern Cape (East London)
No of participants:   8
Age groups:  18-36
No of males:  3
No. of females:  5
Focus group 10 – Eastern Cape (EL)
No of participants:   8
Age groups:  18-36
No of males:  6
No. of females:  2
Focus group 11 – Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth)
No of participants:   6
Age groups:  18-36
No of males:  6
Focus group 12 – Eastern Cape (PE)
No of participants:   7
Age groups:  18-36
No of males:  5
No. of females:  2
115
Focus group 13 – Gauteng (Johannesburg)
No of participants:   6
Age groups:  18-25
No of males:  2
No. of females:  4
Focus group 14 – Gauteng (Johannesburg)
No of participants:   5
Age groups:  26-36
No of males:  2
No. of females:  3
